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I. INTRODUCTION
The Republic of Indonesia, country in Southeast Asia, consists of 13,667 island,
making the country the largest archipelago in the world. This territory with the
exception of Portuguese East Timor was a creation of Dutch imperialism for 350 years.
Indonesia declared its independence from the Dutch on August 17, 1945.
From 1945 until 1966,' the economic condition in Indonesia faced serious
problems, In 1966, the total debt was (U.S.)$2.3 billion and exceeded export earning. 2
Under the new order regime, the Soeharto effort to stabilize the economic environment
in Indonesia shows a good result. In 1973 as the effect of "global oil shock" Indonesia
emerged from a poor country to modest prosperity. 3
The export of oil plays an important role in the Indonesian economy. In 1980,
Indonesia's export earning from oil was 75%, and it accounted for 70% of government
revenue.
4 However, starting in 1981, the price of crude oil continued to drop from
i
This period is known as the old order, under the Soekarno (the first president of
Indonesia) regime.
William H. Frederick, Robert L. Worden, Indonesia, A Country
Study 60 (1992).
Id. At 139-157.
Terence P. Stewart and Margareth L.H. Png., The Growth Triangle of
Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia, 23 GA. J. Int.l&Comp.L. 1, 41 (1993)
(quoting The World Bank, Trends in Developing Economics, 278(1991).
1
(U.S.)$ 34 a barrel to about (U.S.)$12 a barrel in 1986. 5 This pressure led the
Indonesian revenue.
However starting 1981 the price of the crude oil continued to drop from US$34
a barrel to about US$12 a barrel in 19866 . This pressure let the Indonesian government
to lessen the economic 's dependence on petroleum as a source of export earning and tax
revenue by embarking on a program to diversify the economic base. The government
encourage the private sector to take part in this economic development since the
government itself faced a scarcity of fund.
The government has tried to attract private investment either domestic or foreign
investor by launching deregulation and debureucration program. As a result Indonesia
has emerged the strong economic growth7 booming private investment and surging non-
oil and gas export.
With 200 million people and high economic growth, Indonesia attracts foreign
investors who want to expand their capital, including the foreign franchisors who want
to expand their business. The rapidly growing middle class8 in this country makes a
Terence P. Stewart and Margareth L.H. Png., The Growth Triangle of
Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia, 23 GA. J. Int.l&Comp. L. 1,41 (1993)
(quoting The World Bank, Trends in Developing Economies, 278(1 99 1)). Id.
Id.
Indonesia's GDP in 1990 is 7.1%, in 1991 is 6.6%, in 1992 s 6.0% and in 1993
is 6.0% this rapid growth contrast with US growth of 2.9%, Foreign Economic
Trends and Their Implication for the U.S. July 1993, Indonesia, prepared by
American Embassy Jakarta U.S. International Trade Integration and Implication
for the U.S. USITC Pu. 2621 xiii, 5-45 (May 1993),.
The generally accepted dividing line for the middle class is a person who has an
annual house hold income of $ 500 or more, by the year of 2002 the middle
class will consist of 25 % of the total population .
Despite the high economic growth and the growing middle-class, every year
Indonesia faces a problem to create more than two million jobs. 9 To overcome this
unemployment problem, the government always encourages people to create their own
business by giving vocational training and greater assistance to small-scale enterprises.
In some countries with developing economy, government has paid more and
more attention to the franchise business. This conduct can be explained by the
advantages of franchise business which offer the potential to improve the economic
growth, to open job opportunities within a short period of time, to open business
opportunities for basic material suppliers, and to open the opportunities to absorb
technology, know-how and managerial skills. For example, in Malaysia and Singapore,
the development of the franchise business is handled directly by the government to
make sure that its grows well.
The Indonesian Government has not paid so much attention to the development
of this business 10 There is no regulation in the franchise business despite the number of
international franchises, especially from the U.S." that enter into the Indonesia market.
10
The number of middle class in 1995 are around and estimated rate of 15-18
percent a year Indonesia's fast-Growing Big Spending by The Country's rapidly
growing middle class;
Consumer Spending Fuel Growth, Boots Demandfor Import, 15 East ASEAN
Foreign Economic Trends and their Implication for the U.S. July 1993,
Indonesia, prepared by American Embassy Jakarta. U.S. International Trade
Integration and Implication for the U.S. USITC Pu.2621 xiii, 5-45 (May 1993)
445.8% annually for the last 4 years.
U.S. franchise business in Indonesia in 1996 has 64% of the Market share,
Cristiani S.A. Tumelap, Franchising Business Set To Perform Well In 1997
JAKARTA POST, January 2, 1997
The purpose of this thesis is to make an argument that Indonesian franchises
need protection, and that it is time now for the legislative body in Indonesia to enact a
franchise law since well regulated franchising can be a good boost the economy of
Indonesia. 12 The emphasis of this thesis is to prove that the current laws of Indonesia do
not provide the best protection to Indonesia franchisees.
The second chapter contains an explanation of the laws in Indonesia and their
effects on franchising. In the third chapter the franchise laws in the United States are
discusses since it is probably the only country which provide the most comprehensive
franchise law.
Discussion on the extraterritoriality of U.S. law can be found in the fourth
chapter. The issue is raised as to whether these law can be used by Indonesian
franchisees to cure the problems that they have in a franchise relationship between an
Indonesia franchisee and an American franchisor.
The last chapter will explain the nature of the franchise contract and typical
problems that may arise from it. The explanation of the franchise agreements as an
incomplete contract and the explanation of the relational contracts give a strong base to
understanding the franchise itself. A good understanding of franchising helps in
explaining the matters that have to be considered in drafting the franchise regulation.
Finally, this thesis will inquire into whether the current Indonesian laws provide
enough protection to the Indonesian franchisee and whether the enactment of Indonesian
franchise law is necessary.
12 Compare to President Soeharto comment's that franchising does not contribute
much to boosting investment in Indonesia: "Most franchisees, for example,
import their raw materials. The business rely on loyalties and have very limited
amount of investment," he said
II. FRANCHISING IN INDONESIA
A. Introduction to the Indonesian Law
Although Indonesia declared its independence fifty-two years ago it still uses
some of the law it inherited from the Dutch period. Article two of the transitional
provisions of the 1945 Constitution provided that, as a transitional necessity, Dutch
laws at the time of the Revolution would remain in force provided that such laws were
not contrary to the new Constitution. Government Regulation no. 2 of 1945 interpreted
the transitional article to mean that colonial law survived only two the extent it was not
contrary to the 1945 Constitution, which had retroactive effect to August 17, 1945.
In Indonesia, the laws governing various contracts in the commerce field are lex
specialis to the law of obligation, which is the title of Book III of the Civil Code. 13
Contract is one of the source of obligations; however obligations can also arise based
on statute.
14
In the event of conflict between the law which is the lex generalis regulation and
the law which is the lex spexcialis , it is always lex specialis derogate lex generalis
which means that in the event the lex specialis is silent, the lex generalis should
prevail. In sum lex specialis is supplementary unless stated otherwise. 15
13
14
15
Code Civil [C.Civ] (Soedharyo Soimin, S.H. ed) Indon)
The example of obligation that arise from the statute is a person who undertakes
to arrange the affairs of others must do so in a responsible manner, C Civ art.
1354 (Indon).
Henri Gunanto, The Impact of U.S. Law Propositions on Indonesia Commercial
Law, 29Loy. L.A. Rev. 1047(1996).
The Indonesian law of contract can e found in Civil Code and Commercial
Code. These codes are of 1848 vintage, and they are the same code that the Dutch
colonial rulers used. The Civil Code contains the general Indonesian contract law and
the lex specialis of a number of nominate contract there nominate contracts that are
rooted in the sixth-century Corpus Juris Civilis of East Roman Emperor Justinian and
are the contract of purchase and sale, 16 exchange of goods, 17 rent, 18 depository of
good, 19 agency, 20 guaranty, 21 and settlement. 22
Nominate contracts can also be found in the Commercial Code and they derived
from customs of trade of Venetian merchants of the fifteenth and latter centuries, such
contracts include insurance, bills of exchange, carriage of goods by sea, ship's charter
and the older forms of corporation. 23
A contract could be a combination of to or more nominate contracts or a
contract that does not have its own lex specialis (innominate contract). Currently, a
number of standard contracts of contemporary origin from foreign jurisdiction have
entered the Indonesian scene. Of course, the Civil Code and Commercial Code cannot
16
C. CIV. Book III. ch.V.
Id. at ch.VI.
Id. at ch.VII.
Id. at ch.XI.
Id. at ch.XVI.
Id. at ch.XVII.
22
Id. at ch.XVIII.
19
20
21
23
In 1995, the government passed a new corporation law in Act of Parliament,
No.l (1995) (Indon).
really accommodate this kind of new standard contract since they deal only with the
basic form of contract dating from the sixth to sixteenth centuries.
If these innominate contracts have some elements of the nominate contracts, then
these innominate contracts may be construed by means of the provision of the relevant
nominate contract par analogy. 24 When the situation of no analogy can be found to
prevail in such contract, then innominate contracts should be governed by the general
law of contract and obligation. Examples for these innominate contracts are leasing,
franchising, licensing, merger, and acquisitions.
Jhe innominate contracts, in the main time, rely on the general law of contracts
and the underlying law of obligations. The Department of Justice has made an effort to
codify such contracts into a new lex specialis.
B. Laws Regulating Franchising In Indonesia
Franchising is a system of marketing and distribution in which an independent
businessman pays a fee to the franchisor to get the right to market the product and
service with the sane exact standards and practices tat have been established by the
franchisor and also to get the assistance of the franchisor. 25 Franchising is one
alternative to the need of massive amounts of capital in establishing and operating a
company-owned network of products or service vendors.
In fact it is a perfect combination between two businessmen. The franchisor
obtains new sources to expand his capital, his business concept from a few units to a
national or even international level, new markets and self-motivated vendors of his
Henry Gunanto, Supra note 16 at 1049
25 David J. Kaufmann, Franchising 1992 Business And Legal Issues, 12
(1992).
8product. 26 Advertising program that usually can be prohibitively expensive for the small
business person. 27
The business of franchising is relatively new in Indonesia, 28 beginning in 1970
when an Indonesian Entrepreneur, Dick Gelael, bought Kentucky Fried Chicken to
Indonesia. 29 Today, the business of franchising in Indonesia has grown so rapidly, that
in 1996, the number of foreign franchises in Indonesia increased by 18.5 percent, while
the number of local franchises increased by 13 percent. 30 The number of foreign
franchises operating in Indonesia increased to 141 at the end of 1996, from 119 in the
end of 1995; local franchise rose to twenty six from twenty three only 26 from 23 in the
same period. 31 The increase in foreign franchises was faster than that of local
26
27
28
29
30
31
P. Zeidman, Federal / State Franchise And Dealership Laws, 589 PLI/Comm
105, 114(1988).
David J.Kaufman, Supra note 26 at 12.
Compared to United States, where the franchise business for the first time was
introduced in 1860 by the Singer Sewing Machine, since then franchising has
played more and more important role in the U.S. economy. In 1988, 34 percent
of all U.S. domestic retail sales with a value of $717 billion are made in
franchising outlets. There are over 2,200 franchisors and 533,000 franchise
outlet. Congress has predicted that, by the year 2000, 50 percent of U.S.
domestic retail sales will be made in franchise outlets. P. Zeidman, Supra note
25 at 105 (citing P. Ausbrook and H.Lowel, franchising: Regulation of Buying
and Selling A Franchise, A- II Bureau of National And Corporate Practices
Services No. 34, 1983).
See supra note 9.
Cristiani SA Tumelap, Supra note 13
Restaurant Business In Jakarta Has Promising Future, Jakarta POST,
February 19, 1997.
franchises: the number of foreign franchises had average growth of 445.8 percent
annually during the period of 1991 to 1995, while local firms grew only 5.9 percent. 32
Before expanding his business to foreign countries, the franchisor has to make
inquiries about the laws of foreign country with which he wishes to do business: (1),
are there any laws that regulate franchise sales? (2) are there any restriction imposed by
the various law of that foreign country that could include limitations on franchising to
certain parties, limitation on the rates of royalty and the term of the agreement? (3) is
there any requirement to have government approval for international franchise
agreement with a foreign party? (4) is there any requirement to get the approval from
the government in order to remit foreign currency from the country?33
As noted above, Indonesia does not have a specific law that regulates the
franchise business. Absent laws that specifically regulate franchise, does not mean that
there is no law at all that regulates international franchise transaction in Indonesia.
The relative absence of legislation relating to franchising in Indonesia, the lack
of law relating to anticompetitive matters, the relative absence of litigation involving
franchising, and the comparatively modest amount of damages awarded by Indonesian
courts, make Indonesia an easy country in which a U.S. franchisors may export its
franchise. 34
Many regulations significantly affect both the business and legal aspects of the
franchise relationship. Many foreign franchisors are surprise to know that there are
32
33
34
Amir Karamoy, Franchise Law Should Protect Local Firms, Jakarta Post,
August 15, 1996.
Andrew P. Loewinger, Multiple-Unit Franchise, Arrangement in The Pacific
Rim: Problems And Solution, 10-SUM Franchise L.J. 3 (1990).
Alexander S. Konigberg, Practical Legal Aspect Of International Franchising,
13 Int'l Bus. Law, 297 (1985).
10
many restrictions to in doing business in Indonesia if it involves foreign parties and
foreign capital. 35 The operation of certain business and certain investment by non
national in Indonesia is restricted in several ways.
In 1967 the Indonesian government enacted the Foreign Capital Investment Law
(FCIL). 36 This law was enacted to govern the entry of foreign direct private capital
investment into Indonesia. Basically, under the FCIL, a non-national person is
permitted to make capital investment in any sector of economy as long as that sector has
not been explicitly closed to foreign investment, 37 fulfilling the requirement that, that
particular investment project is approved by the Indonesia government and that the
investment to be under an Indonesian legal entity. 38
Between 1977 and 1978, the Indonesian government issued a series of
regulations that bar foreign companies from conducting business directly in trade
35
36
37
38
Andrew P. Loewinger, Supra note 34 at 4.
Undang-Undang Penanaman Modal Asing No. 1 tahun 1967, Stategazzete
number 1, 1967 and amended by law No. 11 of 1970
The FCIL in article 6 explicitly closed certain sector from foreign investor, they
are basically the important sector for the country that could affect the life of the
citizen, they are: (1) ports; (2) production, transmission and the distribution of
electricity for public use; (3) telecommunication; 94) navigation; (5) aviation;
(6) drinking water; 970 generation of atomic power; (8) mass media.
The purpose of this requirement is to avoiding the uncertainty of the legal status
of the foreign person in international law. With the requirement to have an
Indonesian legal entity we can ensure that the legal status of that entity is an
Indonesia entity which is regulated under Indonesian law. Drs, C.S.T.T.
KANSIL, S.H., POKOK-POKOK PENGETAHUAN HUKUM DAGANG INDONESIA,
294(4ed.l993).
Foreign investments generally are to be formed in an Indonesia limited liability
company which is a type of Indonesia corporation analogues to the France
Societe ananyme and the Dutch Naanloze Venootschapi. Robert N. Hornick &
Mark A. Nelson, Foreign Investment in Indonesia, Fordham Int'l L.J., 724,735
(1988).
11
sectors in Indonesia.
39
Beginning on Mayll, 1989, Indonesia liberalized its foreign
investment restrictions by issuing its new negative list of areas partially or completely
closed to foreign and domestic investment. 40 The latest of the negative list was released
in 1995.
41 Under this new negative list, it may be possible for non-national to do
business directly or to participate in the ownership of Indonesian franchise where
previously they might have been excluded. 42
It is strongly recommended for the foreign franchisor seeking to operate directly
or to license non-Indonesia franchisees in Indonesia to have contact with BKPM (Badan
Koordinasi Penanaman Modal) to get information on what restrictions will apply to
foreign ownership in Indonesia. 43
39
40
41
42
43
Government regulation No. 36 of 1077, dated December 29, 1977, Decree of
the Ministry of Trade No. 382/KP/KII/77, dated December 30, 1977 and
Decree of the Ministry of Trade No. 76/KP/III/78, dated March 9, 1978. The
foreign company that wishes to do business in Indonesia can do so by appointing
an agent or a distributor that will sell and distribute the foreign company's
product in Indonesia. Felix Soebagjo & Fatimah Jaitim, 1 International
Franchising Law, Indonesia 7(Dennis Campbell ed) 1996).
Anything not on the list is now presumably open for investment by both foreign
investor and local investor companies without specific condition, Indonesia: A
negative List and Other Reform, 11 East ASIAN EXECUTIVE REPORT 13, June
15, 1989.
Presidential Decree, No. 31, 1995.
Andrew P. Loewinger, Supra note 34. at 4.
BKPM is a Capital Investment Coordinating Body, an agency that was
established by and responsible to the president of Indonesia. The function of this
department Indonesia government agency is to prepare investment policy and
plans, to promote investment, to identify and formulate the range of investment
and facilities needed, to review and assess the viability of investment
applications, to issue permits and licenses, to monitor and control investment
projects including amendments, to assist the president in making the policy
about investments, and to supervise the implementation of approved investment,
12
One significant regulation for franchising is Presidential Decree No. 32, 1992.
This decree lists the retail business as one of the sector that have been closed to foreign
direct investment. This means foreign chains are barred from directly marketing their
products and operating outlets. 44
Basically, those laws are the threshold for the foreign franchisor before
expanding his business to Indonesia. Once he has passed the threshold, then the
relationship between the franchisor and the franchisee is based on freedom of contract,
i.e. whatever terms they have in a franchise agreement. Since Indonesia does not have
any specific law regulating franchising, the franchise agreement relies on the general
law of contract and the underlying law of obligation. In this situation Indonesia does not
have the lex specialis of regulating franchise law therefore the lex generalis of contract
law that can be found in the Civil Code prevails.
The legal basis for freedom of contract can be found in Article 1338 on the Civil
Code. According to this article all agreements that have been made pursuant to the law
have the effect of binding the parties of the agreement as the law and can not be
canceled except with the consent from the parties of the agreement or because the
reason for cancellation is authorized by the law. All agreements have to be performed
in good faith. The parties to the contracts are bound not only by what is specifically
Presidential Decree No. 35/1985 (March 131985) re Kedudukan, Fungsi Dan
Susunan Orgnisasi BKPM, 33 Warta Cafi 111 (May, 1985) as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 29/1987 (July 28, 1987), 35 Warta Cafi 209
(September 14, 1987) See also Presidential Decree No. 33/1981 (July 27, 1981)
re BKPM,29 Warta Cafi 189 (August 14, 1981), as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 28/1982 (September 13, 1982) 30 Warta Cafi 344(October 25,
1982).
44 RI Has No Choice But To Open Its Retail Market: official, Jakarta POST,
January 6, 1997.
13
provided in the contract but also by that which, according to the nature of the contract.
is required by reasonableness, custom, and statute. 45
In sum, in order to give effect to the contract, the specific provision of a
contract are supplemented as needed by statute, custom, and reasonableness. 46
Generally, in Indonesia the relationship between franchisor and franchise is
governed only by the franchise agreement with the requirements that the agreement is
not in contradiction with a statute, the principles of reasonableness, custom or public
policy. The franchisee does not have the obligation to obtain authorization or approval
or other action and there is no requirement to file a notice or filing with any
governmental authority or regulatory body before enter into and perform the franchisee
agreement.
47
All that is required before operating the franchise is the business license
(SIUP) from the Minister of Trade. 48
The next matter that is very important for franchising is the trademark element.
Trademark is often cited as " the corner stone" of the franchise system. 49 The
franchisor would make sure that this trademark has enough protection in the target
country since it is the most valuable thing in franchising. In franchising, one of the
reason why the franchisee buys a franchise is the trademark. The franchise would
always want to be sure that the trademark licenses he or she is buying has value, i.e. a
45
46
47
48
49
C. Civ. art 1339, 1997. (Indon)
Sudargo Gautama, Robert N. Hornick, AN Introduction To
Indonesian Law, Unity IN Diversity, 131 (1974)
Felix Soebagjo supra note 40 at 9.
Id.
Danaya Wright, The Golden Arches Meet The Hallowed Hall, Franchise Laws
And The Law School Curriculum, 45 J. Legal Educ 119, 122 (1995).
14
strong and well known trademark that has been protected by the franchisor. In
Indonesia, legal protection to the holder of the trademark is provided by Trademark
Law No. 92/1992 which is uses the constitutive system.
C. The Possible Form of Franchising in Indonesia
Another consideration for franchisor who wishes to export his business abroad
is the "legal vehicle to be used in exporting the franchise business." 50 In general, a
franchisor has the following four alternatives available to establish his business abroad:
1. "Direct Franchising"
In this situation, the franchisor grants franchise to an individual outlet directly
from the host country to open an outlet in the target country. In this case, the
franchise can be from the host country or from the target country. 51
2. "Franchising by the establishment of a branch or subsidiary" 52
The franchisor will have a presentative in the target country by establishing a
branch office or incorporating a subsidiary and proceeds to franchise individuals
usually in the same manner it franchises in the host country.
3. "Joint venture franchising" 53
The franchisor establishes a joint venture agreement with an entity (usually a
national of the target country) and exploits the franchise in the target country. In
50
51
52
53
Alexander S. Konigsberg, supra note 35 at 297.
Id., The host country is the country in which the franchisor presently exploit its
franchise system. The target country is the country in which in the franchisor
wish to expand his franchise business.
Id.
Id.
15
this case, the foreign franchisor looks for an Indonesian partner to establish a
joint venture company and open the outlets in Indonesia.
4. "Area or Master of Franchising"
54
In this situation, a franchisor grants to another party (usually a company or
other legal entity that is generally a national of the target country) an area to exploit the
franchise system in the target country.
The enactment of FCIL has clearly influenced the vehicle available to the U.S.
franchisor who wishes to expand his business to Indonesia. For example, the franchisor
is required to get approval from the government prior to incorporating a subsidiary or
establishing a branch office in Indonesia.
As long as the franchisee in Indonesian and the franchisor does not establish a
place of business in Indonesia and franchises directly from the host country, such a
franchisor will not be required to get approval from the government, The requirement
are that the law affecting all commercial transaction plus contracts in general be
respected. 55
The problem with this direct franchising in Indonesia is that, in the event of
termination of a particular franchise agreement, it is unlikely possible that the
franchisor can take over the franchised business if that business is one of the kinds of
businesses that have been closed to foreign investors
The preferable form of franchising in Indonesia is the master or area franchise
agreement, whereby the franchisor will grant an area franchise for the entire target
Id
55 See the explanation about how this contract law and commercial law prevail in
the case that there is no specific law regulate the new business concept (lex
specialis deroeate lex eeneralis) in chapter 1 section 1.
16
country or at least a significant portion or region thereof. The area franchise agreement
will permit the Indonesian franchisee to:
i. Franchise the subfranchisee in the target country;
ii. Own all of the franchise outlets in the target country;
iii. Combine both outlet owned by the franchise and the subfranchisee. 56
This form is preferable when the situation set forth below prevail, when the
distance between the host country and the target country is significant, and when there
is big difference in language, culture, custom, and legal system. By choosing this form,
almost every foreign franchisor can expand his market to Indonesia as long as it is not a
field of business that has been placed on the negative list.
However, the franchisor can also choose another form of franchising such as a
joint venture or the opening a subsidiary or branch office in Indonesia. This mean that
this business involves foreign investment in Indonesia and therefore, the FCIL and all
business restrictions will apply. This means that the fields restrictions in which it is
possible for foreigner to do business are more limited if foreign capital is involved.
The most desirable possible kind of business open to this form of franchising is
manufacturing, since a company or an entity that uses foreign investment cannot do
business in distribution of goods and services at the retail level. However, the
wholesale distribution of products manufactured by joint venture companies is allowed.
They are permitted to sell their own products to other companies that use those
For a further discussion about the possible forms of franchising abroad, see
Alexander S, Konirgberg. Practical Legal Aspect of International Franchising,
13 Int'l Bus. Law, 297-311(1985).
17
products as capital goods, spare parts, building materials or equipment, and raw or
supplementary materials in their manufacturing process.
57
Price Waterhouse, Doing Business IN Indonesia, Information Guide
23. (1985).
III. FRANCHISING IN THE UNITED STATES, A COMPARISON
A. Laws Regulating Franchising in the United States
Franchising as a distribution method was establish for the first time in the
United States in I86058 and had major growth after World War II. 59 A booming and
growing population in the post-war period was ripe for the rapid development of
franchising.^he increasing demand for goods and services needed a good tool to
overcome it. Franchising has proved to be an adequate tool to fulfill this demand.
The manufacturer of a product often found itself without sufficient capital to
crate a good distribution network and to increase its production to supply the new sales
and services representative. 61
These new sales and services representatives were the result of the returning
servicemen who had the opportunity to get loans from the Veterans Administration to
finance their business ventures. 62 These ambitious and inexperienced people were able
to start their own business with training and supervision from a franchisor.
58
59
60
See, supra note 29.
Lewis G. Rudnick International Franchising AN Overview 5 (Martin
Mendelsohn ed 1984).
The accelerating growth of franchising is the result of that it provided people
and capital, it also created a later an alter ego out of the manufacturer.
Coleman R. Rosenfield The Law OF Franchising 7 (1970).
61
Id at 6.
Lewis G. Rudnick supra note 60 at 6.
18
62
19
This development of franchising, of course, was not without its problems. More
and more franchisor focused on the sale of franchises rather than on selling goods and
services to the public or providing training and support systems to their franchisees. 63
Franchisors will try anything to get people interested in their business. Unfortunately
they sometimes also use bad practices like providing a misrepresentations or failing to
provide important information to the franchisee about the franchise.
This situation attracted the attention of state and local authorities, who sought
ways to prevent perceived abuses by some franchisors. As a result, on January 1, 1971,
California was the first state to implement a law that regulated franchising
specifically.
64
In October 1979, the first federal regulation in franchising emerged. The Federal
Trade Commission promulgated "Disclosure Requirement and Prohibition Concerning
Franchising and Business Opportunity Ventures (the "FTC Rule'). 63
Basically the laws regulating franchising in the United States can be divided into
two categories:
i. The laws that require "the disclosure of information about or the registration of
the franchise business prior to the sale of a franchise". These laws are usually
referred to as franchise sales regulations;
63
64
65
Id. at 7.
Philip F. Zeidman, supra note 27 at 160.
16 C.F.R. § 436. 1-3 (1995).
20
ii. The laws that govern "the termination, cancellation, non renewal, or other
conduct pertaining to the franchise relationship after a sale has been made".
These laws are referred to as franchise relationship regulations. 66
The United States was the only country that specifically regulated franchising on
a specific national level. This situation changed in 1988 when franchising became
subject to specific regulation in twenty-two countries. 67 In 1988, the Commission of
European Communities adopted "Block Exemption on Franchising," which affects
franchising in the sixteen countries of the E.C. and Iceland (they all signed the
agreement on the European Economic Area). 68 This practice was followed by France
which adopted a law and regulation of the requirement of presale disclosure to
prospective franchisees. The next countries who also followed these practices were
Mexico, Brazil, and Alberta, Those countries have the requirement that the franchisor
has to provide pre-sale disclosure to perspective franchisee. 69
1. Franchise Sales Regulation
Franchise sales regulation in general is a requirement of what the franchisor
should do before marketing his franchise, and it gives a right to the prospective
franchisee to receive reliable information before signing the franchise agreement. The
franchisor has to comply with this law, otherwise the franchisor cannot engage in
66
67
Byron E. Fox, Henry C. Su, Franchise Regulation-Solution In Search Of
Problem, 20 Okla. City U. L 241, 264 (Summer and Fall 1995).
Andrew P. Loewinger, 1 International Franchising Laws,
INTRODUCTION, 6 9Dennis Campbell ed. 1996).
Id. at7.
Id.
69
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franchise sales activity. He has to register the franchise and disseminate a disclosure
document to the prospective franchisee, so the franchisee can make an informed
investment decision. 70
On January 1, 1971, in order to prevent the franchisor from marketing his
franchise fraudulently or with inaccurate information or a perception of different
leverage (disparity in bargaining power) between the franchisor and the franchisee,
California enacted its Franchise Investment Law.
71
It was followed by Hawaii, Illinois,
Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, Virginia, Washington, Arkansas and Florida. In other words
seventeen different state franchise laws were enacted. 72
70
71
72
David J. Kaufmann, supra note 26 at 43.
Cal. Bus. &Prof. Code §§ 31,000-31516.
ARK CODE ANN. § 4-72-207 (Michie 1987); Cal. CORP. CODE § 31000-31516
(west 1971); FLA. STAT. Ch. 817.416 (1993; HAW. REV. STAT.§§ 482 e-1, -5,
-8, -9, 11, 12 (1988); Ill.Rev. Stat. Ch. 121 Vi, Para. 1701-44 (1991);
IND.CODE §§ 23-2-2.5-1 to -51 (1983); MD. CODE ANN., BUS. REG. §§ 14-
201 to - 233 (1981); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445-1527 (1984); MINN STAT. §§
80C.01 to .22 (1981); N.Y. GNE.Bus. Law §§ 33-680 TO -695 (McKinney
1981); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 51-19-01 to -17 (1989); OR.REV. Stat. §§ 50-
650.005 to -085 (1982); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13 -1-557 to -574 (Michie 1990);
Was. Rev. Code §§ 19.100.010. to -940 (1979); Wis. Stat. §§ 553.01 to .78
(1978).
Many of these states franchise laws require registration and disclosure. As a
prerequisite for the franchisor to be registered in a state, he must file an
application with: a filing fee; a form appointing an in-state agent to receive
service of process a copy of all franchise and related agreement; any proposed
advertising; an accountant's consents to use audited financial statement; escrow
papers; a guarantee of performance; signature; signature pages; a table of
content; the identification of sales person.
In some states the franchisor is also required to file these items: operating
manual; article of incorporation; certificate of incorporation; certificate of
assumed name; a listing of all franchises sold during specified period.
22
Unless a statutory exemption is available, State registration and disclosure law
require the franchisor to register and disseminate to the prospective franchisee
disclosure document before the offer or sale of the franchise in the state. As a first step,
the franchisor has to file a prospectus or disclosure document which describes all the
material facts of the franchise sales transaction. As a second step the franchisor has to
deliver the field disclosure document to the prospective franchisee at the earliest of the
following:
i. The first "personal meeting" between the franchisor and the prospective
franchisee. (The first meeting here is the face-to-face meeting, not including the
conversation through the telephone and correspondence),
ii. Ten business days prior to the execution of the agreement between the
franchisor and the prospective franchisee,
iii. Ten business days prior to any payment from the prospective franchisee to the
franchisor of any monies regarding the sale or proposed sale of the franchisor
These state franchise laws prohibit misrepresentation in the disclosure document
and to force the disclosure of information which a prospective franchise might consider
important before buying franchise. 73
The relation between the state laws of federal franchise law is that the state
franchise law are not preempted by the FTC rule as long as they are consistent with the
FTC rule. Until today, there is no federal regulation regarding only post franchise
sales, so the FTC rule preempts the state franchise law only with regard to whether or
not a relationship is a franchise and the time a franchisor has to deliver the disclosure to
David J. Kaufman, An Introduction to Franchising and Franchise Law, 603
PLI/Comm 9,48 (1997).
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the prospective franchisee. If the state franchise laws provides more protection then it
applies.
74
To achieve more uniformity, in 1975, Uniform Franchise Offering Circular
(UFOC) was prepared and adopted by the North American Securities Administrator
Association and its predecessor, the Midwest Securities Commissioners Association.
The most updated UFOC guidelines were promulgated on April 25, 1993. 75 The new
UFOC guidelines provide several changes in the section of the franchise offering
circular franchise.
76
It requires the use of "Plain English" contain expanded disclosure
under some items of information as to supplier arrangements and advertising and
computer requirements, and include extensive new charts and tables as to various
fees.
77
74 44 Fed Reg at 49, 971 (August 24, 1997).
Andrew P.Loewinger, supra note 68 at 8.
76
77
Reprinted in [extra edition] Business Franchise Guide (CCH) No. 161 at
10(May 25, 1993). The 1993 UFOC guidelines have twenty-three items of
disclosure they are: (1) the franchisor and its predecessor affiliate; (2) the
business experience of the franchisor; (3) litigation affecting the franchisor; (4)
bankruptcy affecting the franchisor; (5) initial franchise fees; (6) other fee; (7)
the franchise's initial investment; (8) restrictions on sources of products and
services; (9) the franchise's obligations; (10) financing available to the
franchisee; (11) the franchisor obligations; (12) the franchisee's territory; (13)
the franchisor's trademark; (14) the franchisor's patent, copyright, and
proprietary information; (15)the franchisee's obligation to participate in the
actual operation of the franchise business; (16) restrictions on what the
franchisee may sell; (17) provision on renewal, termination, transfer and dispute
resolution; (18) use of public figure; (19) earning claims; (20) list of outlets;
(21) the franchisor's financial's statement; (22) a copy of all contract; (23) the
receipt of the circular by the franchisee.
Byron E Fox. Supra note 67 at 266.
24
The UFOC is not the only disclosure format available the franchisor. In October
1979 the Federal Trade Commission promulgated a rule entitled "Disclosure
Requirements and Prohibition Concerning Franchising and Business Opportunity
Ventures."
78
This rule applies nationally, even in states that do not have their own franchise
disclosure or registration laws. As long as the state franchise laws provide no less
protection than they do, the FTC franchise rule neither preempts the field of franchise
regulation nor negates or limits existing state franchise laws.
79
However, the FTC permits the franchisor to use UFOC format, and by January
1, 1996, the FTC has required that all franchise offering circulars in the United States
comply with the new UFOC guidelines. 80
78
79
80
16 C.F.R. § 336.1(a)(1) to (20) 1995.
The FTC rule consists of twenty categories of information (1) identifying
information about the franchisor; (2) the business experience of the franchisor's
directors and key executives (chief executive and chief operating officer,
financial, franchise marketing, training and services officers); (3) he
franchisor's business experience; (4) the litigation history of franchisor and the
person listed in number 2; (5) the bankruptcy history of the franchisor of
information and the person listed in number 2; (6) a description of the
franchisee; (7) money required to be paid by the franchise to start the
franchisee; (8) continuing expenses of the franchise; (9) list of persons with
whom the franchisee is required to do business; (10) goods and services which
the franchisee is required to purchase, lease or rent; (11) a description of the
consideration paid by third parties to the franchisor or any of its affiliates as a
result of the franchisee's purchases from such parties; (12) the franchisor
assistance in financing ; (13) restrictions placed from such parties; (14) required
personal participation by the franchisee; (15) termination, cancellation, and
renewal of the franchise; (16) the number of franchisees and their termination;
(17) the franchisor's right to select or approve a site for the franchise; (18)
training programs for the franchisee; (19) Celebrity involvement in the
franchise; (20) financial information about the franchisor.
16 C.F.R. §436.1(a)(21)(1995).
58 Fed. Reg. 69,224(1993),
25
The difference between the state franchise laws and the FTC rule is that the
FTC rule does not mandate the registration, while the state franchise laws mandate that
the disclosure document must be first submitted to a government entity for approval. A
franchisor cannot sell his franchise in a state if he does not have the approval of and
attendant registration by the respective franchise agency. 81
The purpose of this kind of regulation is to provide the prospective franchisee
with sufficient information to evaluate franchise opportunity. Thus before deciding to
buy this kind of franchise, the franchisee can consider whether or not she can handle
this business and whether or not the franchisor will provide enough assistance. In sum,
by the franchisor's giving the franchises this disclosure, he or she consider about the
risk of this business.
2. Regulation of the Franchise Relationship
Generally, a franchise relationship regulation comes into play when the
franchisor decides to end the franchise agreement either because of the termination of
the agreement by the franchisor before the expiration date or because the agreement
itself has expired and the franchisor refuses to renew the agreement.
The franchise relationship regulations began in 1970. 82 These regulations
emerged because in franchise business, the franchisee invest substantial amounts of
money and much effort, but some times some franchisors disregard this facts and
terminate the agreement or fail to renew franchise agreement at the expiration date. 83
81 David J Kaufman, supra note 26 at 44.
Byron E. fox, supra 67 note at 267. See infra notes 85-87
David J. Kaufman, supra note 26 at 81
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Nineteen states 84 have enacted substantive laws governing the relationship between the
franchisor and the franchisee. Many of these require a "good cause" for termination or
nonrenewal of a franchise agreement85 and adequate notice standards for termination86 .
The scope of this kind of regulation also include cancellation and non renewal of the
franchise agreement, 87 the protection of franchise's right to form a association the
84
85
86
87
Ark Code Ann. §§ 4-72-201 to 210 (Michie 1987); Cal Bus And Prof.
CODE §§ 20000-2004 (West 1980); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 42-133 e-h
(West 1986); DEL, CODE ANN . tit. 6. §§ 2551-2556 (1980); D.C. Code Ann.
§§ 29-1201-1208 (Supp. 1989); HAW. REV. STAT. § 482E-6 (1985); ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 815. Para. 705/1-705/44(1991); IND. CODE §§ 23-2-2.7-1 to 7
(1985); Iowa Code §§ 523 H.l to H.17 (1993); md. Code Ann., Com Law
§§ 11-1301 to 1307 (1994); MICH. COMP.Laws §§ 445.1527 (1984); MINN.
Stat. § 80c. 14 (1992); Miss. Code Ann. §§ 75-24-51 to 61 (1972); MO.
REV. STAT. §§ 407.400 to 410,420 (1986); NEB. Rev. STAT. § 87-401 to 410
(1993); N.J. REV. STAT. § 56:10-1 to 12 (1993); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §
37-5A-51 (1996); VA. CODE. ANN § 13.1-564 (Michie 1950); WAS. REV.
CODE §§ 19.100.180, 190 (1991); Wis. STAT. §§ 135.01 to 07 (1984).
See, e.g. CONN. GEN. Stat. Ann. § 42-133f require a good cause for
termination but "not to be limited to franchisee's refusal or failure to comply
substantially with any material and reasonable obligation of the franchise
agreement."
See, e.g. Conn, Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 42-133f (1986), Minn. Stat. § 80c. 14
2(a) (1992), N.J. Rev. Stat. § 56:10-5 (1993) require notice to given to the
franchisee sixty days prior the termination. See, also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6. §
2554 (1980), IND. CODE § 23-2-2.7-3 (1985), MISS. CODE. ANN. § 75-24-53
(1972), MO. Rev. Stat. § 407.405(1986), and Wis. Stat. § 135.04 to 07
(1984), require at least ninety days prior notice. But see AAMCO Industries,
Inc. v. De Wolff, 312 Minn. 95,250 N.W. 2d 835 (1977) (holding that there is
no requirement for prior notice it would be futile); Al Bishop Agency, Inc. V.
Lithonia-Division of National service Industries, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 828 (E.D.
Wis 1979((notice period extended where it was impossible to sure within the
prescribed time).
See e.g. Franchise Investment Law, Haw. Rev. Stat. § 482E-6, restricting
termination and non renewal of franchises
27
freedom from franchisor intervention, 88 and protection of the franchisee's territory from
franchisor encroachment.
89
Until now there's no precise standard regulation that applies nationally
regarding the termination of a franchise or the renewal of a franchise agreement.
90
However, the basic idea of this kind of law is to protect the franchisee from being
abused or treated unfairly by the franchisor.
B. The Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Laws to International Franchise Sales
by U.S. Courts.
In a business transaction between two persons from different legal systems, the
interference with a county's laws by the extraterritorial application of a foreign law is
a, constant possibility. The Extraterritorial application of the U.S. law by U.S. court
here is discussed in connection with the court jurisdiction over an action by an
American that has been happened outside the United States but which has an effect
within the border of the United Stated. This subject raises the question whether
Indonesia franchisee can file a claim in U.S. court and use the American law to protect
88
89
90
See, e.g. California Franchise Investment Law, CAL CORP. CODE §§ 31000-
31516, § 31220, forbidding a franchisor to restrict the right of a franchise to
join a trade association.
See, e.g. MINN. STAT. §80c.l8. 2860.4400 c Unfair and Inequitable Practices.
It is considered to be unfair and inequitable practices to compete with franchisee
or grant another franchise to another person in the area that has been previously
granted exclusively to a franchisee.
Byron E. Fox supra note 67 at 286
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his or her right. It is an interesting phenomenon that an increasing number of American
franchisors have expanded their business into international markets.
91
Some of the factors which enhance this growth of international American Franchising,
are the following:
(i) Now, there is a trend (assumption) that franchising is a good vehicle to expand
the business into international markets; (ii) The advance of telecommunication
systems like satellites and the Internets and services allowed the consumers of
other countries to know better about the products and services provided and
offered in other countries; (iii) The assumption that U.S. has become a saturated
market, and the franchisors see other countries abroad as a good opportunity to
expand their markets; 92 (iv) The American-minded mentality of, for example,
international students who study in the United States; they sometimes buy an
American franchise and bring it to their home country; (v) Some times a
franchisor expands his business to foreign markets for the egotistical reason that
he finds it exiting to tell everybody that he has expanded his business in foreign
countries with his believe that this will help him to improve the image and make
it easier to expand his franchise system in his own homecountry. 93
91
92
93
To get the idea of this growing activity, we can see that from 1971 to 1986, the
amount of American companies which franchise beyond the territorial limit of
the country jumped from 156 To 354 and the total number of U.S. franchise in
international market surged from 3,365 to 31,626. In 1988 more than 374 U.S.
franchisor have 35,000 outlets in more than 160 countries. ANDREW P.
LOEWINGER, supra note 68 at 10 quoting Bruce Walker, James Cross, A
Progress Report On The Scope of International Expansion by U.S. Franchise
Systems (1989), address to the Society of Franchising Conference 1988.
Alexander S. Konigberg, supra note 35 at 281.
Alexander S. Konigberg, Practical Problems and Suggested Solutions
Associated with International Franchising, 7 SPG Franchise L.J. 3 (1988).
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One of the questions may arise from the internationally expanded franchising is
which law should govern this international franchising, the law of the host country or
the law of target country. Moreover country does not have specific laws regulating
franchising, can the U.S. franchise law be applied extraterritorially by U.S. Courts.
U.S. companies considering franchising in foreign countries must be aware of
U.S. federal law and the law of the country in which they intend to license the
distribution of their product or service. The appropriate question here is whether U.S.
franchise laws always apply to international franchise sales by American franchisors.
Generally, a statute will be applied extraterritorially if Congress actually
intended for a particular law to apply outside the United States.
94 The first
extraterritoriality case coming before the Supreme Court American Banana Co. v.
United Fruit Co. (1904). 95 In this case both parties were American companies which
were doing business in Panama. American Banana Co. sued United Fruit Co. under § 2
of the Sherman Act in an American court for an alleged unlawful monopoly. 96
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes refused to accept jurisdiction since the act
causing the damage was done outside the territory of the United States. Holmes adopted
94
95
%
See, e.g Ralis v. RFE/RL. Inc., 770 F 2d 121, 11222 (D.C. Cir 1985) (In
France, Radio Free Europe allegedly fired Dr. Max Ralis. after twenty five
years of service, because the American corporation discriminated against older
expatriates); Boureslan v. Aramco, 857 F 2d 1014 (1988), affd on rehearing,
892 F. 2d 1271 (5 th cir. 1990) et. banc) (in Saudi Arabia, engineer Boureslan
accused his American employer, Aramco, of discriminating on the basis of
religion and national origin. In these case the plaintiffs were American citizens
and the defendants were U.S. corporations. These cases were not actionable in
American courts because the alleged multinational misconduct occurred abroad
and U.S. employment statues are generally not applied extraterritorially.
213 U.S. 347 (1909)
American Banana Co., at 353.
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a strict rule, that if there is no clear mandate by Congress, the effect of the statute is
within " the territorial limits over which the lawmaker has general and legitimate
power." 97
This strict rule against extraterritoriality was modified by the courts in the early
1930s98 in Blackmer v United States," the court held that Walsh Act 100 applied
extraterritorially because this act expressly mandated extraterritorial jurisdiction. 101 In
this case, the court states the presumption that "legislation of the congress unless the
countrary intent appears, is construed to apply within the strict territorialist jurisdiction
of the United States." 102
Seventeen years later in Foley Bros v. Filardo 103 the court recognized two
rationales to justify the presumptions which are the "assumption [in interpreting
ambiguous laws] that Congress is primarily concerned with domestic conditions 104 and
"the canon construction which teaches that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary
97
Id., at 357
Jonathan Turley, "When In Rome": Multinational Misconduct and The
Presumption against Extraterritoriality, 84 Nw.U.L. Rev. 589, 604(1990.).
284 U.S. 421 (1932).
28 U.S.C ss 1783, 1784 (1982).
The Walsh act expressly allowed service of process on American citizens in
foreign country.
102 282 U.S. 421
336 U.S. 281,282(1949).
Foley Bros, 336 U.S. at 285
98
99
100
101
103
104
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intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States.
105
Finally in Timeberland Lumber Co. v. Bank of America l06 the Ninth Circuit
developed three past test for territoriality, the court must consider the following:
1. The effect on foreign commerce for the U.S.
2. Whether the conduct is of such a type and magnitude so as to be recognizable as a
violation of the Sherman Act, and
3. Satisfaction on international comity and fairness.
1 . Federal Franchise Law
The practice of franchisors to expand their franchise to be located outside of
United States can be divide into two types:
i. An American franchisor sells his franchise to a foreign franchise who reside
outside of the United states to be located in aforeign country, is describe as
"pure outbound"; 107
ii. An American Franchisor sells his franchise to a franchisee who resides in the
U.S, franchise which will be located outside the United States as described as "
a mixed outbound." 108
105
106
107
108
Id.
549 F. 2d 597 (9th Cir. 1977).
John R.F. Baer, Kenneth R. Costello, Gray, Gary R. Duvall, Joyce G. Mazero
and Erik B. Wulff, Application of U.S. Franchise Laws to International
Franchise Sales, 15-FALL Franchise L.J. 41, 61 (1995).
Id.
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The question now is whether or not the federal franchise law also governs the
pure outbound transaction. On the basis of the cases on the extraterritoriality of U.S.
law discussed above, the extraterritoriality of federal franchise law is examined below:
The FTC rule's disclosure provisions my apply to a pure outboud sales if
first, in can negate the presumption against extraterritorial application of
any statutes and also the presumption against any action taken by an
agency under those statutes. 109 In sum, plaintiff has to show that
Congress actually intended for the FTC rule's disclosure provision to
apply outside the United States border. 110 The second requirement is that
there negative effect on domestic competition or domestic consumers as a
result of the United States franchisor's conduct. 111 One should also bear
in mind that there is currently no private right of action under the FTC
rule, and the Commission Would not consider filling an action for an
activity that has no effect on United States competition consumers.
Beside these two factors, international comity has to be taken also into
consideration. 112 There is a tendency now for the court to use the presumption against
extraterritoriality more often than to answer the question of international comity 113
109
110
111
112
113
Id.
A statue can be applied extraterritorially if it has the affirmative information
from Congress expressed clearly, Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S.
138, 146-147 (1957).
Id.
Jonathan Turley, supra note 99 at 610.
See, e.g. Boureslan, 857 F 2d 1014.
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The purpose of Congress in the FTC rule regarding the scope of the
applicability of this rule is now examined. The first inquiry is whether there was an
intention for the FTC rule to be applied extraterritorially in a "pure outbound"
franchise sale. Under § 6(g) of Federal Commission Act, " 4 The FTC has the authority
to promulgate its own rules. 115 The jurisdictional scope of FTC rule is determined by" 6
§436.1. The jurisdictional scope is described as any franchising in which such activities
are "in commerce" or "effect commerce," as defined in § 4 of the FTC act. 117 The
definition of commerce also includes commerce with foreign nations, but this does not
mean that all foreign transactions are affected by the act, since in § 5(a) (3), 118 unfair
methods of competition involving commerce with foreign nation "are included from the
applicability of s 5 (a) unless the action has the effect on domestic commerce or
domestic export with foreign nations."
The rule applies to all franchisors and franchise brokers that operates within the
Commission's jurisdiction. 119 However when drafting this document, the Commission
apparently did not consider the application of this disclosure requirement to
international franchise sales. 120
114
15 U.S.C strict security 41 et. Seq.
115 16 C.F.R par 436, 15 U.S.C § 46(g)
116 16 C.F.R §436.1,
117
15 U.S.C 44.
1,8
15 U.S.C. 45
119
16 C.F.R § 436.1 (21) and Fed. Reg. 59639.
John R.F Baer, supra note 108 at 61
.
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The disclosure document is " tailored to domestic franchises." 121 Most of article
requires franchisor to disclosure activity that occurred in the United States and not in
other countries. For example, one of the articles in the disclosure document requires the
franchisor to state whether it is subject to any current states or federal agencies. 1"
Under U.S. bankruptcy history. 123 the identity of all franchise is determined ~in the
state in which the prospective franchise lives or where the proposed franchise is to be
located."
124
Nowhere in the rule or in the Statement of Basis and Purpose of the FTC rule 1^
are foreign mentioned. However, the discussion about the relation between FTC rule
and state franchise law can be found here.
It is unlikely that the pure outbound transaction will be regulated by the FTC.
One argument supporting this statement is that the applicability of the FTC rule is
limited to franchise and business opportunities only. The rule itself gives the definition
of what is a franchise, 126 and it also give the exemptions from the rule.
121
122
123
124
125
126
id.
16C.F.R. §436.1 (a)(4)(iii).
16 C.F.R§ 436.1 (a)(5)(I)
16C.F.R§436.1(a)(16)(iii)
43 Fed Reg. At 49,966,992 9 Aug. 24, 1979)
16 C.F.R §436.2(A) and Final Guides to the Franchising and Business
Opportunity Ventures Trade Regulation Rule 44 Fed. Reg 49966 (1979) at I A.
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One of the characteristics of a franchise according to the FTC rule is that the
significant controls and significant assistance come from the franchisor. 127 In the
international franchise context especially in a pure outbound transaction, the control and
the assistance from the franchisor is not significant as in a domestic franchise business.
Examples of the significant control by the franchisor can be site approval, site
design, operation hours, production techniques, accounting practices, promotional
campaigns, customer restrictions, or areas of sales restriction. 128 Examples of
significant assistance may be formal sales, repair business training programs,
accounting systems, etc. 129 Due to the difference in language, cultures and the lack of
information in the target country, the franchisor may not be able to exercise all of these
controls or may exercise this control and give assistance in a more limited ways.
The FTC rule's exemption clause 13° provides that a franchise does not include a
relationship created solely by an agreement between a licensor and a single licensee to
license a trademark, trade name, service mark, advertising, or other commercial
symbol where such license is the only one of its general nature and type to be granted
by the licensor with respect to that trademark, trade name, service mark, advertising,
or other commercial symbol. 131
127
128
129
130
131
Assistance and control are significant for the franchise if they make the
franchise dependant upon the franchisor's expertise, P. Zeidman, supra note 27
at 126
44 Fed. Reg 49967 at IA.
Id.
16.C.F.R § 436.2(a)(4)(4)(iv)
16C.F.R§436.2(a)(3)(iv)
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The reason the commission exempts a single trademark transaction is that the
licensor only exercise passive control to ensure that quality standards are met to protect
its trademark. The rule requires a control more than just a passive control it requires
the franchisor to have an active control over the franchisee's method of operations. 132 it
is often the case that, in pure outbound franchise transaction, "the agreement is drafted
and negotiated with condition in the country in mind" which may constitute" the only
one of its general nature and type" that might exempt that agreement. 133
Thus from all of the provisions, we can infer that Congress did not intent to
make this rule apply to international franchise sales. However, still there is no explicit
exclusion of such international franchise transactions.
The second inquiry about the extraterritoriality of a regulation asks if there is a
negative effect on domestic competition or domestic consumer. Section 5 of the FTC
Act regulates the antitrust issue and the consumer protection issue." 134 For antitrust
issue, the Act would not apply extraterritoriality unless the restrict abroad might affect
U.S. interest directly substantially and foreseeably. This is known as the effect test 135
According to the cases, the Act would apply extraterritorial if the conduct has 'a direct
and substantial adverse effect' of the U.S. either to a U.S. consumer or to competition
in the U.S. 136
132
133
134
135
136
44. Fed. Reg. At 49,969, (1979) statement of Basis and Purpose, 43 Fed. Reg.
At 59,709(1978)
John F. Baer, supra note 108 at 62.
15U.S.C§45.
John F. Baer, supra note 108 at 62 (quoting AREEDA H.HOVENKAMP,
Antitrust Law II 236 (1984 Supp).
Id.
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In the context of international franchising, the consumer who has been injured
by a franchisor does not necessarily have to be a U.S. consumer but could also be
foreign consumer. Would the act apply extraterritorially to remedy the injury of a
foreign consumer arising from unfair and deceptive acts by the franchisor abroad and
would it have enough negative effect in the U.S. to pass the threshold?
If a franchisor failed to submit the disclosure to a foreign franchise in a foreign
country, the one who would be injured here is the foreign franchisee. In United States
v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. 131 a U.S. licensor signed a patent licensee agreement
with a Japanese licensee, whereby Westinghouse would not manufacture in Japan and
the licensee would not operate in the U.S. The court found that higher prices for
foreign consumers did not injure U.S. commerce and it was not a matter that concerned
U.S. antitrust or consumer protection laws.
However, even though there is no U.S. consumer in a pure outbound
transaction, the FTC is still interested in protecting the franchisor's competitors from
U.S. that also do business in that foreign country. The failure to deliver the disclosure
document to a foreign buyer does not make a barrier for the entity of other franchisor
competitors into the market and therefore, does not have a negative impact on
competition.
The FTC rule may not apply to a pure outbound transaction simply because
Congress did not intend to apply this rule extraterritorially. In sum, nowhere in the rule
can we find expressly the intent of Congress to extend the jurisdictional scope of the
137 471 F. supp. 532,524 (N.D. Cal. 1978), affd on other grounds, 648 f.2d 642
(9
th
Cir. 1981).
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rule beyond the limit of the U.S., and secondly, failure to give the foreign franchise the
disclosure document according to the FTC rule would not normally bring negative
effects to U.S. competitors. 138
2. State Franchise Law.
At present there are 17 states in the United States which have the franchise
registration and disclosure law. The jurisdictional scope of the state franchise law varies
from one state to another and usually includes all franchise sales activity that takes
places "in this state."
The term "in this states" has different meaning from state. A State's law may
be triggered based upon the following:
i. Where the sale or offer is originated. 139
Minnesota, California, Maryland, and Wisconsin have exemptions for an "out
of state" sale. 140 The condition for an out-of-state exemption include the
following:
138
139
140
John F. Baer supra note 108, It 63
See, Cal. Corp. Code § 31013 (Deering 1979 & Supp. 1982); Hawaii Rev.
STAT. § 482 E- 5 (c) (1976& Supp. 1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 121 Vi. §
7003(21) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-83); MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 445.1504
(Supp. 1982-83); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80C. 19(West Supp. 1982); N.Y.
GEN.BUS. Law § 681.12 (Mckinney Supp. 1981-82); N.D. CENT. Code § 51-
19-02. 14b. (1981); OR. REV STAT. 650.015 (1977); R.I. GEN LAWS §
19.2803 (k) (Supp. 19800); S.D. CODIFIED Laws Ann. § 37-5A-8 (1977) &
Supp. 1982); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 19.100.020 (1978 & Supp. 1982);
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 553. 59 (West Supp. 1982)
Minn. Stat. Ann § 80c.03 (n) (West Supp. 1982(; Cal. Admin. Code tit. 10
§ 310.100.1 (1982); MD. ADMIN, CODES tit. 62 § 02.02. 10. 04.A (1978); Wis
ADMIN. CODE § 31.01(5) 1980).
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(1) When the offer or sale is made to a non-resident of the state;
(2) When the offer or sale of a franchise is made to a person who is not
domiciled in the state;
(3) When the offer or sale is made to a person who is not present in the state;
(4) When the offer or sale does not violate any law of the foreign jurisdiction
ii. When the franchise business in the state. 141
iii. When the offered resides the state. 142
iv. When the offer is accepted in the state 143
The application of these state franchise laws is triggered only by in-state and
out-of-state transaction and not by U.S. and non U.S. transactions. Nowhere in the
statement of purpose of some state franchise laws is there mentioned the applicability of
state franchise laws to international franchise. 144
141
142
143
144
See, e.g. CAL. CORO. CODE § S 311013 (Deering 1979 & Supp. 1982); ILL.
ANN. STAT. Ch. 121 Vi, S 703 (21) Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-83); MICH. COMP.
LAWS. ANN. § 445. 1504 (Supp. 1982-83); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 681.12
(McKinney Supp. 1981-82); N/D/ CENT. CODE § 52-19-62. 14b-(k) (Supp
1980); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-2. 5-2(b) (Burns Supp. 1982); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 56, § 345 (m) (2) (ii) (1979 & Supp. 1982); Minn. Stat. Ann. §
80e. 19.1 (West Supp. 1982); VA CODE § 13.1-559(1978 & Supp. 1982).
IND. CODE § 23-2-2.5-2(a) (Burns Supp. 1982); MD Ann. Code art. 56, § 345
(m)(2) (I) (1979 & Supp 1982, Hawaii Rev. Stat. 482 E-5(c) and 482-4(a)
(1976) & Supp. 1980).
Except for Washington, the same laws that apply when an offer to sell is made
in the state also apply when an offer is accepted in the state.
John R.F. Baer, Kenneth R. Costello, Gary R. Duvall, Joyce G. Mazero & Erik
B. Wulff, Application of U.S. Franchise Laws to International Franchise Sales:
The Applicability of State Franchise Laws To International Franchise Sales, 15
FALL-Franchise L.J. 107, 108 (1995).
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The state franchise laws' provisions are broad enough to cover outbound offers
or sales because in some states, 145 the statutes will apply if the offer
146
or sales emanated
from the states. However, this does not mean that in every international transaction
these state laws will apply for the following reasons:
i. As long as the offered is not actually present within the state, then the state
registration and disclosure laws will not apply; 147
ii. The franchisor can get way from this state by conducting the offer in a place
other than his headquarter office in that state;
iii. The franchisor can apply for an exemption. 148
For state franchise relationship laws the situation that trigger the applicability of
this law usually require the following conditions 149 :
145
146
147
148
149
Thirteen states of the fifteen states that have the disclosure and registration
requirement.
The definitions of an offer are broad, including the correspondence or
negotiations. Under Minnesota franchise law, a franchisor's telephone
conversation offering the prospective franchise his franchise can constitute an
offer. An offer is "any attempt to dispose of franchise or to solicit an offer buy a
franchise." Case Manhattan Bank N.A. v. Clusiau Sales and Rental, Inc., 308
NW 2d 490.
Indiana and Virginia (jurisdictional element not triggered by fact pattern),
Hawaii, Illinois, Michigan (exemption where the prospective franchisee is not
domiciled in the state and the franchise business will not operate in the state),
Washington (jurisdiction triggered if the offer violates the franchise or business
opportunity law of the foreign jurisdiction in which it is accepted), Wisconsin,
California, Maryland, Minnesota, and Rhode Island have the out-of-state sales
exemption.
For example the franchisor conducting a trade show somewhere outside of the
United States and the franchise buy the franchise right away from there.
For further explanation about this, see John R.F. Baer supra note 145 112
41
i. The franchisor requires the franchisee to open or to have a business in that state;
ii. California and Indiana require that the franchisee is domiciled in that state,
regardless of the place of business.
The applicability of these state laws to international franchise transactions raises
a controversial question: would the state law apply to protect person who have no
connection to the state 150 except that the order party to the transaction comes from that
state, or the offer or sale emerged from that state?.
The extraterritoriality or state law also raises another question since under
article 1 section 8, clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution, Congress has the exclusive power
to regulate foreign commerce. State regulating international franchise transaction may
be challenge as unconstitutional if they impinge upon Congress' exclusive authority to
regulate foreign commerce. In Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin l5 ' and Epstein v.
Lordi 152 the court stated that the power to regulate foreign commerce between the state
and the federal government is not the same, even in the absence of federal action.
The parties will always choose the law of the forum that gives more advantages
to them. Sometimes, it is too late for a foreign franchisee to realize that, had he chosen
a particular states law he would have had greater remedy or better protection. It is an
unlikely case that foreign franchise who has agreed to use a foreign forum to resolve he
dispute will succeed in asserting his claims under a state's registration and disclosure
statute with the argument that the foreign country does not provide enough remedy.
150
151
152
In essence, the state laws have one common intention, the protection of their
resident and the purpose of the state government is to protect the resident of the
state. John R.F. Baer, supra note 145 at 112
328 U.S. 408((1946)
261 F. Supp. 921 (D.C.N.J. 1996), affd., 389 U.S. 29 (1967)
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This tendency to assume that a foreign courts do not provide enough protection
for the right of a person " is not only speculative, but reflects something of provincial
attitude regarding the fairness of a foreign tribunal.
153
There is no clear cut guarantee that the state law still apply extraterritorially and
give the right to the foreign franchisee to assert his right under this law without any
argument to the contrary (that state franchise law should apply extraterritorially) from
the opposed party. 154
3. The Antitrust Law
The uniqueness of the relationship between the franchisor and the franchisee
makes the laws concerning restraint against competition relevant. As mentioned above,
in a franchise system, a franchisor and a franchisee are separate business entities but the
franchisor can impose a certain degree of controls over the franchisee. The question is
how far franchisor can impose the controls before being charged with imposing
unreasonable restraint to the competition.
The Sherman Act, 155 Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 156 Section 2 of the Clayton
Act as amended by the Robinson Act, Section 5 of the FTC Act, 157 as well as the state
153
Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci America, Inc., 858 F. 2d 509 (9 th Zapata Off-
shore., 407 U.S. 1 at 12 (1977).
154
155
156
For further argument why state laws should be jurisdictional limited see John
R.F. Baer, Kenneth R. Costello, Gary r. Duvall, Hoyce G. Mazero & Erik B.
Wulf, Application O U. S. Franchise Law to International Franchise Sales, Part
II; The Applicability of State Franchise Laws to International Transaction
FALL-Franchise L.J. This article concluded that the application of Federal and
State Franchise Law should be limited to franchise operation in the U.S. with
regard to the that arise from the disclosure requirement to foreign franchisee.
15U.S.C.A. § 1.
15U.S.C.A§21
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antitrust law ("Little FTC Laws") are often used by third parties claiming that the
franchise organization has come into market unfairly and destroyed the fair competition
between them. The franchisee who feel that the franchisor has put too many restriction
on him also often uses this statute.
The main purpose of the enactment of the antitrust law is to enable the market to
have free competition. The side effect from the enactment of this law also protects the
franchisee. For example, the franchisee who has been terminated by a franchisor
because of the failure to adhere to a certain price policy and to a certain region to have
the outlets can file a suit charging the franchisor and other franchisees with a horizontal
conspiracy to violate the antitrust law. 158
The related question for an international franchise is whether foreign franchisee
can file a claim of an antitrust violation by a U.S. franchisor for conduct that takes
place outside of the United States, or whether it would be up to the Department of
Justice and Federal Trade Commission, as the federal agencies charged with the
responsibility of enforcing the antitrust laws to sue a U.S. franchisor for
anticompetitive conduct that occurred in a foreign country. In sum, what is the
requirement that triggered the application of the U.S. antitrust law extraterritorially?
The extraterritoriality of the antitrust law issues has been through many stages.
Beginning in 1909, the Supreme Court held that U.S. antitrust laws could not reach
conduct outside of the United States. 159
157 15U.S.C.A§45
158 See e.g. United States v. Sealy, 338 U.S. 350 (1967).
159 American Banana Co. V. United Fruit co., 213 U.S. 347, 356-59 (1909)
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In 1913, the court began to broaden the application of this law. In United States
v. Pacific & Arctic Railway & Navigation Co., 16° the court extended its jurisdiction to
a Canadian company for its conduct to monopolize U.S.tranportation both inside and
outside of the United States.
Finally, in 1945, Judge Learned Hand, in United States v. Alumunium Co, of
America 16 ' stated that U.S. courts could have jurisdiction over foreign conduct under
the antitrust law as long as the conduct was intended to and in fact, had negative effects
in United States. 162 The earlier usage of this test was only under the Sherman Act, but
then the court also applied the effects test to many violation under the Clayton Act and
the Federal Trade Commission act. 163
A foreign franchisee must first prove that the alleged conduct of the franchisor
has negative effect U.S. commerce. The fact that the franchisor is a U.S. national is not
enough to assert his right under the antitrust law.
It is unlikely that an Indonesian franchisee would have the right to file a claim
under the U.S. antitrust law when he cannot prove that the action by an American
franchisor toward him could have a negative effect on U.S. commerce.
160
161
162
163
288 U.S. 87 (1913).
148 F. 2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945).
[W]e are not to read general words, such as those in [the Sherman]. Act without
regard to the limitation customarily observed by nations upon the exercise of
their powers limitations which generally correspond to those fixed by the "
conflicts of laws". We should not impute to congress an intent to punish all
whom its court can catch, for conduct which has no consequences within the
United States. Alcoa, 148 F. 2d at 443.
Jonathan Turley, supra note 99 at 608.
IV. PROBLEMS THAT MAY ARISE IN INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISE
TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN AMERICAN FRANCHISORS AND
INDONESIAN FRANCHISEES.
A. The Protection Of Indonesian Franchisees Under The Current Franchise
Regulation
The prototype of a franchisee in America is the middle-income person, a person
who usually works as an employee who wants to be independent. He has save a great
deal lot of money until he decided to buy a franchise business using almost of his entire
savings, with a hope that he can be his own boss and that he can have his own business
that promises a good living.
Unlike the profile of a U.S. franchisee, the typical Indonesian franchisee is a
wealthy person. He usually has more than one outlet and owns the master franchises
from more than one franchisor. 164
This difference can be explained because usually a foreign franchisor will not
extend his business to a foreign country using direct franchising; he prefers to sell his
master franchise to a franchisee in that country, and then, that franchisee has the
responsibility to develop that franchise in the target country.
164
For example Martina Sudwikatmono is the owner of Planet Hollywood Jakarta
and Hong Kong, she also the holder of the master franchise of Tony Roma's.
Lawrey's and Cafe Nanini. Ron Muller is the owner of Pizza Hut, Ponderosa
Family Steakhouse, Dairy Queen, and Red Lobster Seafood and Steak.
Hertanto, Selera Makan Ala Eropa, Tiara, September 18 1996,
http:\www. vision. net. id/tidra/166/opp 166 html.
45
46
As a result, the buyer of a master franchise has to pay a great deal of money to
the franchisor. 165 This amount is to expensive for a middle-income person in Indonesia.
For the moment, Indonesia franchises of an American Franchises consist only of high-
income persons.
Another significant difference between the Indonesian franchisee and American
franchisee is that in the United States there is a perception that franchisor has greater
leverage in the negotiating the franchise agreement. This belief stems from the
assumption that the franchisor always has greater economic power, more information
and more access to legal consultation. 166 The franchisee is always assumed to be in
weaker position since he always seems to be in position of no having no other choice.
He really wants to open a business that can give him a guarantee in the sense that they
become a member or the family of this big chain of a known trademark, trade name, or
service mark.
165
166
To open a fast food restaurant, a franchisee at least has to pay Rp 2.000.000.000
(US$ 900.000.000), id.
Donald P. Horwizt, & Walter M. Volpi Regulating The Franchise Relationship,
54 St. John L. Rev. 217, 248 (1980), see also Byron e Fox supra note 67 at
185 n. 169 quoting Rupert M Barkoff & Andrew C. Selden, Counseling
Franchisees, ABA FORUM ON Franchishing, 1985 ANNUAL FORUM,
Often, there truly is no Counseling of prospective
franchisees Many franchisees never involve an attorney in
the process. They believe, or are told, that an attorney will be
costly and will only slow down the process or kill the deal
In other circumstances, the franchisee has made up his mind
long before he seeks legal Counseling In this circumstances, the
lawyer is being asked simply to "bless" the franchise
agreement, and may be further hand tied by his client's
statement that the franchisor has announced that the agreement
is non-negotiable. Therefore, the client is not willing to pay
significant sums for what he perceives to be useless advice.
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In this market, it is more likely that the franchisee is looking for the franchisor
and he will be likely to agree to every term that the franchisor has in the standard
contract. The franchisee is overwhelmed by the exaggerated promises from the
franchisor that he can manage his business successfully with no need of prior
experience. 167 In sum, in the United States, there is an assumption that a franchisor has
greater economic power that led him to have the bargaining power.
The basic problem that the American franchisees have begin with the disparity
of information between a franchisor and the prospective franchisee, this fact puts the
prospective franchisee in a weaker bargaining position. This situation leads to the one
sided contract leaving the prospective franchisee with the take-it-or-leave it contract. 168
Often this standard franchise contract contains the unreasonable franchisor's
requirement (for example tying contract). The other problem that may rise after the
franchise agreement has been signed by the party is the arbitrary termination of a
franchise agreement by the franchisor. 169
Would an Indonesia franchisee also face these problem? It depends on so many
factors: for example, the profile of the Indonesian franchisee and the availability of the
regulation to cure this abuse by the franchisor.
These Conditions that have been faced by American franchisees are totally
different in the international market. The need to have reliable prospective franchisee is
greater in this context. Of course, not everybody will qualified for these requirements.
167 Donald P. Horwitz, supra note 167 at 255
168 Byron E Fox, supra 67 note 259
See Kamenshine, Competition Versus Fairness in Franchising, 40 Geo. Wash.
L. Rev. 197, 199(1971).
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Since the Indonesian prospective franchisee must have strong economic power, it is
more likely he also have stronger bargaining power compared to a U.S. franchisee.
Knowing that he has to invest a large amount of capital and realizing that he
will have a-long-term franchise agreement, it is unlikely for an Indonesian franchisee to
enter the business without preliminary actions like conducting a prior investigation.
This conduct help to eliminate the disparity of information that in the end will, cause a
disparity in bargaining power between an Indonesian franchisee and an American
franchisor.
As mentioned above Indonesia does not have any law that requires a franchisor
to provide the prospective franchisee with the information that will help the prospective
franchisee to make an informed decision. The American franchisor also does not have
the obligation to provide the Indonesian franchisee with disclosure since it is unlikely
that U.S. federal law and state law will apply extraterritorially. 170
170
Until now, there is no clear answer as to whether or not federal and state
franchise laws apply to the international franchise transaction. The FTC has not
clarified its position with regard to international transactions. The possibilities
that the franchisor has in dealing with international transaction are the
following:
1. The franchisor does not submit any U.S. disclosure at all;
2. Submitting to the franchisee in foreign country a U.S. disclosure for
informational purpose only;
3. Submitting to the foreign franchisee a U.S. disclosure with a notification
that some of the proportion of the disclosure might not be relevant to
international transactions;
4. "Integrating all foreign operations into a standard U.S. disclosure";
5. "Preparing a separate UFOC to be used in international sales
transactions";
6. Using the target country's disclosure law, with or without submitting a
U.S. disclosure.
John R.F. Baer, supra note 145 at 117
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The problem that may arise from this lack of regulation that obliges a franchisor
to disclose is that the Indonesian franchisee does not have a strong right to ask for
information. It leaves the franchisor to decide at his own discretion whether or not he
will give all of information or remain silent.
Many prospective franchisors often find themselves reluctant to give the
prospective franchisee a disclosure. This conduct stems from the fear that the
prospective franchisee would not very pleasant with the document's sensitive
information and, in the end decide not to become a franchisee. 171
In an international franchise transaction context, the cost and effort of preparing
such a document can be high, and since in Indonesia the franchisor does not have to
comply with any law requiring disclosure and the uncertainty of the application of U.S.
franchise law, the franchisor is more likely to choose to invest the cost of preparing the
document into marketing the franchise or more tangible investments in the franchisor's
business. 172
After the prospective Indonesian franchisee has provided himself with enough
information to make the business decision, the franchisor and the franchisee will
negotiate the terms of the contract to determine their own rights and obligations
usually, a franchisor will give the franchisee a standard contract. 173
John R.F. Baer, supra note 145 at 117
171
172
173
M. Stuart Sutherland. The risk And Exposures Associated With Franchise
Noncompliance, 42 Bus. Law 369 (1987).
Id. at 373
The application of the standard contract in franchising has a special reason:
This advice [that a franchisor will not compromise or negotiate
any part of her franchise contract and that a franchisee must
determine whether he can live with the terms or not] represent a
clear ethic of non-negotiation, not merely to boost the bargaining
power of the franchisor, but also to define what, fundamentally,
it is that the franchise is purchasing. In other words, franchisors
50
Obviously, this rich prospective franchisee is not forced to buy this franchise
and is free to decide to buy other franchises that have better conditions, or he can
decide not to invest his capital at all.
According to Indonesian law, there are four requirement that must be fulfilled
in order to make a contract valid:
i. Both parties of the contract must consent;
ii. Both parties must be legally competent to do so;
iii. The contract must have a certain subject agreed upon
iv. The contract must have a lawful purpose. 174
As long as those requirements are fulfilled, basically, a person can make any
kind of contract (according to freedom of contract). The franchisor and the franchisee
can negotiate what terms they agree upon and put it into a written franchise agreement,
and since the Indonesian franchisee presumably has the same leverage or the same
bargaining power, a contract can be reached as long as there is no duress, mistake, or
fraud.
This question leads to another question: can a contract provide the best
protection for the interests of a franchisee and a franchisor, or does a contract law not
protect the franchisee's business adequately from unfair and inequitable conduct by a
franchisor so that government intervention is needed to eliminate or at least reduce this
use the standard form contract to signal aspects of the
relationship that the franchisee can expect-the relational elements
of company structure and philosophy. Buyer's guide authors echo
this same norm. The clear messages is that the refusal of the
franchisor-is a hallmark of the relationship that the franchisee is
purchasing.
Gillian K. Hadfield, Problematic Relations: Franchising and The
Law of Incomplete Contracts, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 927,961 (1990).
174
C. Civ. art. 1320(Indon).
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conduct? Thus, how far can the government intervene in this business before being
accused of highly burdening this kind of activity.
B. Does a Private Contract Between an Indonesia Franchisee and an
American Franchisor provide Enough Protection?
The heart of franchise relationship is the private contract between the franchisor
and the franchise. 175 This is perfectly true in Indonesia since the current regulation does
not provide specific rules for this kind of business. Both parties would try to transform
their mutual commitment to do their best in the franchise systems into a long-term
written franchise agreement.
Both parties have to give a great deal of thought and planning before they start
to draft the contract. In a perfect world, they will be able to predict and to write in that
agreement a complete list of all the business decisions that a franchisor could make
under all circumstance in the future and also how they will respond response to the
franchisee compliance. 176
1 . The Dilemma of a Franchise Contract.
The parties in making the contract would contemplate the possibility of having
some problems in the future and would have some provisions in the contract on how to
prevent and overcome those problems. The classic problems that have always
threatened this kind of business lie in the commitment between the franchisor and the
franchisee. How are they going to trust each other, and how will they put it in the
written agreement?
Byron E Fox, supra note 67 at 254.
176
Gillian K. Hadfield, supra note 174 at 946.
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The franchisor would draft a contract emphasizing the protection of his
trademark and his goodwill. The franchisor feels that he needs to protect the trademark
for the following reasons: the franchisor has invented a differentiated product or
service that has been recognized by the consumer, and the consumer is willing to pay
the value of the trade mark; the value of the trademark helps the franchisor to see and
collect greater royalty from his franchisee, 177 and the Lanham Trademark Act 178
requires the licensor to control the quality of the product or service sold by its licensee
under the licensed mark; otherwise is legal abandonment of the trade mark. 179 As a
result, the franchisor will be vary cautious in preventing the abuse of his trademark.
However a franchisee, as the owner of her own outlet and as an independent
business person, intends to make the business profitable for himself. The main question
for a franchisee is how to generate as much profits as possible directly from his or her
own outlet. This perception may lead a franchisee to pay more attention in generating
his or her profits and than to the quality of the product as long as she or he can make a
better profit at the expense of lower quality products or service. He or she ignore the
fact that the judgement of the entire franchise system by customers depends on their
experience at an outlet. 180
Driven by the desire for the profit, franchisees tend to act on the basis of their
own profits and decline to take into consideration that the trademark will lose its value
if they forget that they, as part of the big franchise family, have to work together to
maintain the reputable trademark.
177
Id. at 948
178
15 U.S. §§ 1055 and 1127.
179 Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F. 2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959).
180
Gillian K. Hadfield, supra note 174 at 948.
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a. The Free Riding Problems.
Uniformity is important matter in franchising, The success of a franchise is
dependent upon consumer ability to recognize the franchisor's trademark with uniform
goods and services. 181 Unfortunately , some franchisees may believe that they can have
more profit from their own outlet by deviating from the franchisor's standards; for
example, the franchisee may fail to adhere to the franchisor's marketing and operation
plans. This problem may come from the inability of the franchisee in negotiating the
contract. A standard franchise contract can serve better some franchisee in a certain
area. For the sake of uniformity franchisors like to have their standard contracts for
every franchise agreement that they make. Of course these standard contracts would not
be appropriate for all of the franchisees. Even if a franchisee has the capability to
negotiate the standard contract, sometimes the franchisee fails to see certain matters
that should be added to the contract.
Given the fact that the franchisee can take advantages by exploiting the value ao
the goodwill of the trademark, without making a real contribution to maintaining the
goodwill of the trademark, the franchisee may try to have a cost saving reduction and
depend on the overall value of the franchise, sacrificing the product or service quality.
This justifies the needs of the franchisor to maintain the uniformity of this product and
services by putting some control over the franchisee. Does the franchisee provide all of
the services that are supposed to go with the selling of a product or does the franchisee
correctly mix a formula for a soft drink, etc. 182
181
182
Donald P. Harwitz, supra note 167 at 271
Gillian K. Hadfield, supra note 174 at 948.
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In sum, the very heart of franchising, the trademark element, poses a substantial
problem i.e. free-riding, and the franchisor's basic problem is to prevent the franchisee
from having an incentive to minimize the cost. 183
b. The Opportunism Problems
In protecting the franchisor's reputational capital, the franchisor would like to
have a clause in the franchise agreement whereby the franchisee makes a commitment
not to engage in "free riding conduct." 184
Basically, the franchisor has the control provision in the franchise agreement.
This control provision has been a controversial topic, for how far can a franchisor exert
some control over a franchisee before being charged with opportunistic conduct. The
franchisor can easily abuse his power to increase his own revenue at the expense of the
franchisee. For example, the franchisor may use the quality control reason to require
the franchisee to buy the product from him or another approved supplier just to
increase his own revenue while the franchisee can buy that product from other sources
for a more reasonable price and with the same quality without having any effect on the
uniformity of a franchise. 185
As a result, a franchise may wish to have the franchisor's commitment written
in the franchise agreement not to engage in opportunistic conduct by abusing his
control and disregarding the franchisee needs.
183
Id. at 950
Byron E. Fox, supra note 67 at 258
Donald P Harwitz, supra note 167 at 225.
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In starting the franchise business, a franchisee invest a certain amount of
capital. These investments usually are not easily recoverable when the franchisee
decides to change his line of business. This capital is effectively a sunk cost. 186
To explain this statement, one needs to understand that usually, after the
franchise agreement is terminated or expired, the franchisee is still bound by the
covenant not to compete, which means that the franchisee, with all of his utility and
ability, cannot start the same business within certain time.
It happens often that franchisor will buy all the franchisee's assets below the
real value, depending on the provisions of the contract governing the resale of
equipment and furnishing to the franchisor when the agreement reaches an end.
In a business, profits are everything. A franchisee has to put up a certain
amount of money as a fixed cost and hope that she will recover that cost plus a profit.
"A profit maximizing franchisee will decide how much to produce and therefore what
price to charge based on marginal cost. Ordinarily, a franchisee will be able to charge a
price above its marginal cost as a result of the market power it derives from its
exclusive territory. This price is, however, limited by what consumers are willing to
pay, given the availability of substitute goods. If marginal cost increase but consumers'
willingness to pay does not, the price may only cover marginal costs and not total-
fixed plus variable cost."
187
186
187
Prof. Hadfield explained the difference between fixed cost overhead or up-front
costs that are sunk and the cost that can be recovered.
* A fixed cost is an up front cost which must be incurred in order to produce
any amount of goods or services. A variable cost is one that varies with the
quantity of amount of goods or service provided. A marginal cost is the variable
cost of producing additional amount of good or services." Gillian K Hadfield
supra note 174 at 950, n 95 quoting William Samuelson, Economics 427-
31 (11 th ed. 1996).
Gilian K. Hadfield, supra note 174 at 992.
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The fact that the franchisee has to pay fixed costs that are basically a sunk cost
makes the franchisee think twice before she shuts down the business because she did
not get any profit (in the sense of paying back the overhead assets after paying the
variable cost). 188 The franchisees tend to continue the business even though it does not
make any profit.
The franchisee's decision to shut down the business and sell the assets would
not recover his or her whole cost because basically the assets are the sunk assets. 189 It is
better to continue the business than to lose the whole investment despite the fact that
the franchisee has never recovered his or her investment in fixed cost, and it is more
likely that he or she would shut down the business when he or she realized that the
amount he or she is losing exceeds what it would cost simply by shutting down the
business and sell the assets. 190
This situation give the franchisors a chance to take advantage by making a
decision that will benefit the franchisor at the expense of the franchisee without the
franchisee's going out of business because the franchisee does not want to lose her
investment altogether. 191 It is clear here that the franchisor wants to eliminate the free
riding problems by putting some clause in the contract and on the other hand, the
franchisee would like to have some clause in the franchise agreement that can prevent
the opportunistic conduct. As a result of these two opposite needs, "the franchisors
seek to expand their control, franchisees seek to erect boundaries. 192
188
189
190
191
192
Id. 950
Id.
Gillian K. Hadfield, supra note 174 at 950.
Id. at 952.
Id.
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1 . The Incompleteness of a Franchise Agreement
It is hard to distinguish a legitimate exercise of control and opportunistic
conduct. For example, a franchisor requires a franchisee to increase advertisement
activity. This conduct can be seen in some circumstances as legitimate exercise of the
franchisor to control free riding problems, but in another sense, it could be seen as
opportunistic conduct. 193
In a franchise, agreement one must make a distinction between the franchisor's
conduct in exercising control is legitimate one or opportunistic one. This is, of course
not an easy task and explains why a franchise contract are necessarily incomplete. 194
In other words incomplete here means that the contract itself cannot answering
the question of whether or not a particular franchisor's demand can be deemed as
legitimate one and whether or not the franchisee has acted in compliance or violate that
demand. 195
The franchise contract structures the " real life of the franchise" The clauses in
that contract give some rule on how the franchisee and the franchisor are going to make
their commitment start in reality-for instance, how and when to make the payment, the
training level that the franchise should get, the advertising responsibility, the limit on
how sales must be made, how many outlet should be opened, the location of the outlet,
etc.
196
Id.
194
Id. at 929.
195
Id. at 946
196
Id. at 956
58
However the contract itself does not really specify. How expensive a promotion
can be? How often can outlet refurbishing be required? What measures to boost sales
can be required? The franchise contract sketches only a bare outline, one which is then
filled in by the ongoing balance-the belief, power and incentives that compromises the
relationship.
197
Basically, the franchisors and the franchisee in a franchise agreement are trying
to make or build a framework for a mutual commitment to the long terms success of
the franchise and they write down the commitment in an incomplete "relational
contract"
198
197
Id.
"Relational contracting involves those contracts found in
relation that take [] on the properties of "a minisociety with a
vast array of norms beyond those centered on the exchange and
its immediate processes." By contrast with neoclassical system,
where the reference point for effecting adaptations remains the
original agreement, the reference point under a truly relational
approach is the "entire relation as it has developed . .
[through] time. This may or may not include an 'original
agreement'; and if it does, may or may not result in great
difference being given it"
Gillian K. Hadfield. Supra note 186 at 929 n9 (1990) quoting Oliver
Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual
Relations, 22 J. L.& ECON. 233,238(1979).
Another Scholar have described a "relational contract" as
follows:
"A contract is relational to the extend that the parties are
incapable of reducing important term of the arrangement to
well-defined obligations. Such definite obligations may be
impractical because of inability to identify uncertain future
conditions or because of inability to characterize complex
adaptations adequately even when the contingencies themselves
ca be identified in advance."
Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA.
L. Rev. 1089, 1091 (1981).
59
responding to market conditions as they may arise and requires the franchisee to
comply with the decisions that franchisor makes. 199 In view of the nature of the
franchise itself, 200 the parties in the agreement inevitably cannot rely only on what is
written in the contract. It is ironic if the court, in resolving the dispute between the
franchisor and the franchisee looks only at the franchise agreement word-by-word,
without considering their commitment problem and the nature of the franchise itself.
Lack any regulation in requiring disclosure and the incompleteness of the
franchise contract makes the franchisee in Indonesia so vulnerable to the abuse of the
franchisor's control. The standard form of a franchise contract emphasizes the
franchisee's obligation and protects the franchisor ownership of his trademark. 201
Can the Indonesian franchisee get better protection if the legislative body sees
that it is time to enact a regulation and if they consider it is necessary to have one? And
what matters they should be really concern about that should be drafted into that
regulation?
C. Enacting an Indonesian Franchise Law; Is It a Real Solution?
After making an inquiry into the Indonesian franchisee position in a franchise
relationship, it is clear that, although it can be said that the Indonesia franchisee and
the American franchisor have the same bargaining power, their positions are not equal
199
200
Gillian K. Hadfield, supra note 174 at 946. Franchising uses a voluntary
contract as a vehicle for obtaining centralized administration and control over
the marketing efforts of participant in marketing channel. Donald P Harwitz,
supra note 167 at 221.
Franchising poses some unique feature, the relation that derived from it neither
an employment relation nor an independent contracting relationship, it subject to
a market with rapid change and high level of uncertainty. These come together
to one big commitment problem. Gillian K. Hadfield, supra note 174 at 928.
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because basically the franchisor does not have the information inferiority of the
franchisee.
As for the information that the Indonesian franchisee can get from the American
franchisor before signing the agreement, there is no legal right for the Indonesian
franchisee to demand that information unless the franchisor, in good faith, makes that
information available for the Indonesian franchisee. Thus, the first problem that the
Indonesian franchisee must overcome is how to eliminate the disparity of information
that can be caused by the franchisor over promotion, misrepresentation and
nondisclosure.
Secondly, after they sign the franchise agreement, the incompleteness of the
franchise contract brings new problems of how to control free riding and opportunistic
conduct, for example, unreasonable franchisor requirements in the name of quality
control or arbitrary and capricious termination by the franchisor.
It is difficult task for a legislative body in Indonesia to determine what problems
or matter in a franchise relationship that need governmental regulation. If it decides to
have a very restrictive governmental regulation, it would come head to head with the
essence of the franchise relationship, the commitment between the franchisor and the
franchisee. It would also impinge upon the freedom of contract.
Freedom of contract in a civil law country like Indonesia can serve a purpose as
a tool to fill the gap when the code or the regulation does not provide the law to
accommodate the legal relationship between two or more people. The freedom of
contract also give the citizen the right to invoke the sanction of the law if one of the
parties in the agreement breaches the contract. 202
201
Id. at 946
202
C. Civ. Art. 1338(Indon).
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In the commercial setting, the freedom of contract can be used also to satisfy the
changing desire of the parties which frequently occurs. One can imagine that
government could pass a regulation in a certain field that heavily limits the freedom of
contract; in the event that the parties come up with something new and the government
is not ready with a new regulation, the parties will be put in uncertain situation.
In some situations, providing freedom of contract and fulfilling the four
conditions that make agreement binding203 is good enough to accommodate the needs of
the two merchants for "the market place ordinarily involves a network of complex
interests and claims that cannot be resolved adequately by either legislative command
or judicial decision. " 204
Enacting a regulation in a certain matter may pose a dilemma. In some
circumstances, it may appear that one party needs a protection, but if the legislative
body were to decide to enact the regulation, the other party could come to a situation in
which his needs do not really appear in the regulation.
Much regulatory legislation was intended to provide the public and
especially consumers, with protection against perceived ills. In many
instances we must reassess not only the efficiency of that protection,
but also whether the economic, legal and social burdens of
maintaining the legislative insurance are worth such protection. All
regulation it is costly, not only because it is paid for taxation, but also
because it interferes with market forces, increases the size and
complexity of government, and favors one group of people in our
society over another. In many instances the favored group needs
special consideration or protection. But often the claims of the
protected are no better than the claims of the regulated. 205
203
204
205
C. Civ. art. 1320(Indon).
Donald P. Harwitz supra note 167 at 265 foot note omitted.
Donald P. Harwitz, supra note 167 at 268 (Quoting Karmel, A Skeptical
Regulator Looks At The Future of Regulation, Remarks to the Women's
Economic Club, Detroit, Mich., Nov. 20 1997 at 6).
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Efficiency, externalities, and equity are the justification for the regulation of
economic activity. 206 In franchising, the protection of the parties interests often come
from a private contract which may have the problems of disparity of information. 207
Inequality in bargaining power between the franchisor and the franchisee208 is
the defect in a private a contract which hopefully may have to be cured if the
government intervenes by enacting regulation. 209 The problem with this kind of
regulation is that the overly restrictive governmental regulation could set the franchisor
against the franchisee.
210
It may result in undermining the commitment and the
mutuality of effort in keeping the franchisee to make franchise operation. Still, as to the
disparity of information between the Indonesian franchisee and American franchisor, a
regulation requiring full and fair disclosure is need. Full disclosure enables the
franchisee to make an informed decision.
First, the Indonesian legislative body has to determine the scope of this
regulation by defining "franchise," " franchisor" "franchisee,' "prospective
franchisee," and "franchise fee". 211 It is better to avoid an umbrella definition of the
206
207
208
209
210
211
Byron E. Fox, supra note 67 at 262.
This is an inequity that "stems not so much from a disparity between the parties
to a contract in resources or information-these always exist-but rather that the
disparity is so great in some instances that one party is unable to make rational
judgment.
Id. (Quoting ALAN STONE, REGULATION AND ITS ALTERNATIVE 153 (1982).
This is an inequity that "pertains to contract in which the element of duress is
very close from being present."
Id. at 263 n 71 (quoting STONE , supra note 221 at 134).
Byron E. Fox, supra note 67 at 263.
Donald P. Harwitz, supra note 179 at 226
Note, Regulation of Franchising, 59 MINN. L. REV. 1027, 1055 (1975).
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term "franchise" since it may encompass the conventional manufacture-whole seller-
retailer chain of distribution that does not merit statutory regulation. 212 This definition
has to entail franchise elements such as control from the franchisor, the franchise fee,
and the trademark license.
It is a crucial matter here in determining the definition of a franchise since, if it
is too broad, it may entail many of the business relationships in which serious
franchising abuses are not prevalent. It will also put a burden on other relationships
since the regulation requirements such as full disclosure can entail heavy expenses.
It is true the Indonesian franchise may have great opportunity to get the
information from the Americans franchisor even though no regulation obliges the
franchisor to give the information. However one must bear in main, that if the subject
matter of the contract is so complex that it causes great disparity in information
between the parties, problem may then begin to arise, i.e. some franchisors may have
incentives to conceal, mislead, or deceive. In this kind of situation, without any doubt a
regulation is needed to fill the gap in information. 213
One possibility in drafting this regulation is that the legislative body could
consider avoiding the requirement to disclose some items that are open-ended in terms
212
Id. at 1056
213 Byron E. Fox. Supra note 67 at 262 (quoting STONE, Id. supra note 222).
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of relevancy and materiality, 214 which leave the franchisor with his policy to decide
where to draw the line. 215
After receiving certain important information from the franchisor, presumably,
the franchisee has the same bargaining power in negotiating the contract, but in fact the
problem of bargaining power is not ended after the franchise agreement has been
signed by the parties.
Another problems of inequality in power arise between the franchisor and the
franchisee in performing and enforcing the contract. The real "difficulties in
franchising arise in the ongoing exercise of power in the gaps of the incomplete
contract" and do not really come from any unequal bargaining power between the
franchisor and the franchisee in the negotiating the contract. 216
Is a regulation a preferable tool to fill the gaps of the inherently incomplete
franchise contract? As mentioned above the problems that stem from an incomplete
contract are the franchisor's opportunistic conduct and the franchisee's free riding
conduct.
Some states in the United States have been trying to resolve this problem by
enacting the franchise relationship law. 217 These laws generally requires " good cause"
:u
215
216
217
For example, the requirement in the new UFOC to disclose the litigation
activity of the franchisor, officers, director and the like and also the franchisor
predecessor and those affiliates' offering franchises under the franchisor's
principal trademark, Patrick J. Carter, The New Uniform Franchise Offering
Circular: The Franchisee Perspective, 14 Franchise L.J. Fall 1994, at 27.
Byron E. Fox, supra note 67 at 273.
See Gillian K. Hadfield, supra note 174 at 985 n 262
See supra note 85
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for termination,
218 prescribing "good cause" and adequate notice standards for
termination, cancellation, and nonrenewal, preserving the franchisee's right to form an
association from franchisor intervention and protecting the franchisee territories form
franchisor enroachment. 219
The Indonesian legislative body can take these laws as the model in drafting the
Indonesian franchise relationship regulations. However before taking them into the
Indonesian legal system, it is better to make an inquiry into how effective these
regulations are in preventing or curing the problems that arise from the franchise
relationship.
It is true that, in order to have a successful franchise, the franchisor and the
franchisee have to work together to maintain the uniform standard of quality throughout
the franchise system. Often, the franchisor terminates or refuses to renew the franchise
agreement, using the reason that the franchisee has failed to adhered to the uniform
standard of quality.
It can be the case that termination result from a franchisee's unambiguous
failure to maintain the quality standard and a contract clearly providing for termination
upon a finding of such failure." 220
218
219
220
See e.g. N.J. Rev. STAT. tit. 56, ch. 10, §56:10-5" for the purpose of this act,
good cause for terminating, canceling, or failing to renew a franchise shall be
limited to failure by the franchisee to substantially comply with those
requirement imposed upon him by the franchise."; MO. REV. STAT. Tit. 4 ch.
407 § 407.413(5) "good cause" means either of the following :
(1) Failure by the wholesaler to comply substantially with the provisions of
an agreement or understanding with the supplier , which provisions are
both essential and reasonable; or
(2) Use of bad faith or failure to observe reasonable commercial standards
of fair dealing in the trade.
Byron E. Fox. Supra note 67 at 268, foot note omitted.
Gillian K. Hadfield, supra note 186 at 970.
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For example in Dayan v. McDonald's Corps., 221 The franchisor wanted to
terminate his franchise in Paris, France, because the franchisee, Raymond Dayan,
failed to comply with its quality services and cleanness (QSC) standards. 222 In this
situation, the court cannot avoid the situation which it has to apply broad contract terms
to particular fact.
223 For example, the franchisor's photographs of rooting food,
uncleaned equipment, ingredients that had been stored improperly, and stray animals in
the kitchen were used as proof that the franchise had failed to adhere to general
contract requirements to maintain cleanness. 224
In other circumstances, maintaining the uniform standard of quality can be used
opportunistically by the franchisor to terminate a franchisee. Legislation tries to
eliminate this problem by permitting the franchisor to terminate a franchise agreement
only after the fulfillment of some obligations, like informing the franchise a certain
number of days before terminating the franchise agreement or requiring a good cause
for termination and also providing some reason that can be used to justify the
termination. Some of the statutes provide that the franchisee is entitled to recover
damages for the franchisor's unjust termination. 225
221 466 N.E. 2d 958 (III. App. Ct 1984)
222
Id. at 999.
223
Gillian K. Hadfield, supra note 186 at 970.
224 Dayan v. Mc Donald Corp, supra note 222 at 971
See e.g., Del. Code ANN. tit. 6 § 2552 (a) (1974), an unjust termination was
defined as one effected "without good cause or in bad faith".
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One of the critiques of this franchise relationship regulation is that the vague
term of "good cause" brings the element of uncertainty and subjectivity into the
franchise relationship. 226
This term can invite undesirable litigation to determine its content and destroy
the cooperative balance of mutual effort and commitment that is essence of the
franchise relationship.
227 The other disadvantage of this relationship regulation
especially in the termination matter, is that the franchisee will be left in confusion
because there are no unequivocal standards upon which to rely. The franchisee could
come to the conclusion that the termination would be difficult to avoid regardless of
performance and, as an outcome, he could act to be less conscientiously. 228
The requirement of "good cause" here raise another question when the laws
regulating the franchise relationship do not explain a meaningful definition of "good
cause" and do not answer the question of whose good cause has to be fulfilled for the
franchisor justly to terminate the franchise agreement. The effect of the strict franchise
regulation is the abandoning or underestimating of the very essence of the relationship
between the franchisor and the franchisee and the mutual cooperation that comes from
their commitment; thus these regulation undermine franchising as a successful method
of doing business. 229 One should always remember that both parties have a financial
stake in this relationship, and it should give enough incentive to both parties to keep
their commitment to pursue their goal, the success of the franchise system.
Donald P Harwitz, supra note at 167 at 266.
See supra note 212 at 1061.
228 Donald P. Harwitz, supra note 167 at 267.
229
id. at 262
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Considering franchising as one big system, it is unlikely that the franchisor,
without any specific important reason regarding the goodwill of the franchise itself,
would make a decision to terminate the franchisee. The franchisor can have success and
wide expansion of his franchise because he has the franchisees doing his work for him.
It is ironic that without any reason that could put the franchise in danger, the franchisor
would endanger the franchise system by terminating the franchisee.
The long perceived assumption about the franchise regulation is that it is
concerned with protecting a franchisee's sunk investment from the total loss caused by
a franchisor's arbitrary and capricious exercise of contractual power. 230
In the franchise contract, there are some clauses that justify the termination; for
example, termination primarily occurs in the event that franchisees have ceased to pay
their royalties or fail to fulfill certain standards. However in fact, the conclusion of a
franchise agreement either by termination or non-renewal of the franchise agreement
after expiration is never as simple as the contractual provisions that authorize the
franchisor. 231
Franchisors are reluctant to exercise their contractual termination right after
considering the loss "at least temporarily, of a potential profitable local market, as well
as the loss of time and resources spent on the selection, training, advertising and
support of the terminated franchise." 232 One should begin to understand that it is not
easy also for the franchisors just to terminate the contract even for a good reason.
230
231
232
See Gillian K. Hadfield supra note 174 at 951-53 (recognizing that sunk
investment is the franchisee's principal problem, leaves the franchisee
vulnerable To franchisor opportunism).
Byron E. Fox supra note 67 at 290.
Id, at 292.
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This is more true in the American franchisors-Indonesian franchisee
relationship. An American franchisor would be unlikely just to terminate the
Indonesian franchisee since, if he could not find the right person (a person who is
capable financially and meets all of the franchisor's criteria) he will have lost a good
profitable local market. 233
Inquiring into the franchise regulation on the basis of contract would also pose
some arguments against it. Requiring the undetermined "good cause" for termination
would deny the rights of franchisor and other franchisee to enforce the right to bargain
for the uniformity the sake of the goodwill of the franchise and the right to terminate
the franchisees who refuse to abide by the terms of the same franchise agreement. 234
It is not always the franchisor who acts like a bad guy, the franchisee can also
be the bad guy sometimes.
After receiving a full and fair disclosure, the franchisee should be able to
determine whether or not he will refuse to enter into the contract. The parties would
enter into a contract when the "other party enforceably agrees to perform his part of
the bargain not just most of the bargain or the part of the bargain that a future court
finds "reasonable") and the right to bargain for termination of the agreement if the
other party is in breach of the contract." 235 Legislation regulating the franchise
relationship would interfere with this right and transform franchising into "a long-
abandoned, quasi-feudal relation." 236
It is possible that the American franchisor cannot take over the business (the
Outlet) because some Indonesian laws close some field of business from foreign
investment.
234 Donald P. Harwitz, supra note 167 at 272.
235 Donald P. Harwitz, supra note 167 at 272. Footnote omitted.
Id.
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The requirement have the consent of both parties and the doctrine that is already
available for the Indonesia franchisees (mistake, duress and fraud)236 would be enough
to police the actual freedom of the parties to choose whether or not to enter into a
contract of agreed upon terms. According to Indonesian contract law, a contract should
also be viewed as it if it were supplemented with reasonableness, custom, statutes, 237
and good faith from the parties. Combining this law and the relational contract
perspective238 could change the view that the defect in a franchise relationship absence
standard of conduct and performance and the vulnerability of the relationship to
opportunism and free riding are incurable in the sense that the parties in the franchise
agreement are unable to negotiate, enter into, perform and enforce a fair and honest
franchise relationship.
236
237
238
C. Civ. 1321 (Indon).
C. Civ. 1339 (Indon).
Relational contracting is an approach to contract law that examines the
formation, performance, and enforcement of a written contract in the context of
an ongoing relationship between the contracting parties. "Byron E. Fox, supra
note 67 at 246 n 17
V CONCLUSION
It is undeniable that franchising has grown quickly in Indonesia. This
phenomenon has occurred within the past twenty-five years, and is still in its
evolutionary process. The exclusivity of this business to only a few people from the
upper- class explains the government attitude toward it. There are no laws specially
enacted to regulate this field of business.
From this author's point of view, the Indonesian government should pay more
attention to franchising business. Franchising can be a good tool for at least reducing
the unemployment problem and for assisting medium-to-small-scale enterprises in
running their businesses. So far, franchising is only taken as a fast food business to
serve the increasing purchasing power of the middle class to upper-income groups in
society.
Franchising in Indonesian can evolve into a business in which the people from
the middle class would be interested. Maybe one day, when the employment market in
Indonesia has become saturated, the government will see it as a business system that
helps the distribution process and a good way of training people and transferring the
know-how and technology from a tested and well known franchisor to a person who
just learned how to create a business.
The absence of several franchising problems in Indonesia does not give the
government justification to ignore franchising. The nature of franchising and the
240
Sixty percent of the franchising business in Indonesia operated restaurant or
other Food outlet, eighteen percent operated retail business and twenty two
percent were involved in training and consulting, laundry, fitness and health
care. Amir Karamoy, Franchise Law Should Protect Local Firms, JAKARTA
POST, August 15, 1996.
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franchise contract provides many possibilities both for the franchisor and the franchisee
to abuse each other, i.e. the opportunistic conduct by a franchisor and free riding
problems from a franchisee.
The absence of laws regulating franchising in Indonesia puts the Indonesian
franchisee in an unprotected situation from franchisor abuse from the very beginning of
the business. For an Indonesian franchisee, the possibility of getting a full and fair
disclosure depends only on the good faith of the franchisor. A laws requiring the
franchisor to provide the prospective franchisee with certain information is definitely
needed.
The enactment of the law requiring the franchisor to provide a disclosure would
not mean that every problem in franchising the franchising area has been solved. After
receiving the information, making an informed decision, and signing the franchise
agreement, basically a franchisee has solved one problem and come to a new problems
because the commitment problems that they have make a franchise agreement
incomplete.
The commitment problem puts the franchisor and the franchisee in dilemma; on
the one hand the franchisor has a strong interest in maintaining the uniformity and the
goodwill of a trademark by exercising control on product quality decisions and over the
design of the overall system; on the other hand the franchisee needs to be protected
from the opportunistic conduct by the franchisor. The franchise contract fails to address
these problems of controlling by the franchisor opportunism, instead giving the
franchisor the discretion to exercise power that sometimes can lead to the end of the
franchise relationship. Some states in the U.S. have enacted regulations to overcome
this problems. But apparently the regulation are too strict and lead to a situation where
the franchisor loses his ability to conduct his business with the flexibility necessary to
deal promptly with misguided or unmotivated franchisees.
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Learning from this fact, it is better for Indonesia to have a law regulating the
franchise relationship that allows the termination of a franchise contract, providing that
the franchisee has adequate notice before the termination or non-renewal of a franchise
agreement and that the franchisor should make an arrangement for the sale of the
business to a mutually acceptable third party hopefully, full and fair disclosure plus a
delicate franchise relationship regulation supplemented by the availability and
enforcement of existing remedies, will be sufficient to eliminate franchising's major
problems.
In addition to that legal matter, it is important to have a healthy franchise
relationship between the franchisor and the franchisee by making a financial
commitment bonding their mutuality of interest and building a continuous
communication between them to ensure high franchisee motivation. This would help to
eliminate the undesirable business practice of termination. An overly restrictive
regulation would destroy a healthy relationship; the parties would tend to preserve their
legal rights rather that come together and, re-negotiate the problems based on their
commitment. In sum, in making the franchise relationship regulation one should
understand that the franchise relationship is unique and has its specific problems, and a
franchise regulation would come into play in situations in which the parties are unable
to keep their healthy relationship and unable to restore the private relational balance on
their own. Legislation must be carefully drafted so as to address the problems without
crippling and destroying the growth of franchising.
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